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ABSTRACT 
 
 The notion of a “feminine” style has been staunchly resisted by third-wave 
feminists who argue that to posit a “feminine” style is essentialist. Yet, linguists 
such as Norma Mendoza-Denton and Elinor Ochs discuss indexicality and 
shifting through salient variables, a process called entextualization. Further, 
French feminists such as Hélène Cixous and Julia Kristeva use the linguistic 
concept of intertextuality to explain certain poetic uses of language that might 
cause what Luce Irigaray calls “irruption of the semiotic chora”—moments within 
language where boundaries in the semiotic chain of signification are “blurred.” 
Thus, while current feminism has moved strictly away from the idea that there is 
an exigent “feminine” to which all women must aspire, there exists a tenuous, but 
salient connection between the linguistic concepts of indexicality and 
intertextuality on one hand, and jouissance and “irruption of the chora” on the 
other that can inform those styles we might term “feminine” and allow for a more 
productive and responsive perception of “femininity.”  
 Amos’ lyrics illustrate these theories working together; Amos’ lyrics 
represent such a “feminine” style as indexed through use of salient variables; 
thus, Amos’ lyrics represent a sociolinguistic phenomenon wherein gender-based 
salient variables reform what “feminine” is and means, challenging social 
attitudes and the specular feminine persona within both the personal and public 
spheres. The implications of these theories could eventually influence 
iv 
perceptions of women in any particular profession or sphere, as gendered 
linguistic markers influence gender roles and implications, which, in turn, inform 
social change.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORY 
 
 
What is gender? Does it reside in the body? In biology? What about a 
“feminine style”? Does a quantifiable feminine style exist? Is it possible to write or 
read or think in a “feminine” way if gender is, as sociolinguists and body theorists 
argue, a societal construct that is “‘always contestable’” (“You Da Man,” Bucholtz 
444)? Radical French feminist theorists such as Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray 
and linguists such as Julia Kristeva argue that there are feminine linguistic traits 
and feminine ways of communicating which favor duplicity, complexity, and 
subjectivity in meaning. While current feminism tends to leave the thought of a 
definable “feminine” in the past, Judith Butler posits that the materiality of the 
body and its conception as feminine can inform our reading of literature and 
society, allowing us to see and contest the ways in which we reiterate any 
particular gender, expressly femininity.  
Specifically, the French feminist idea of a “feminine” language—a 
language that would defy “patrilinear” rules of language use—heavily implies 
social and linguistic language change. Singer/songwriter Tori Amos’ oeuvre 
indexes just such a dissonant “feminine” identity through a “double-voicing” 
similar to that mentioned by Bucholtz (“You Da Man” 450), wherein the identity of 
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the “hegemonic masculine” is referenced, called to task, and refuted. Might we 
learn—by analysis of texts identified as puzzlingly, yet pleasingly “feminine” in 
style—more about the ways in which women might index their status as 
“speaking subjects” and contest their relationship to hegemonic femininity? What 
changes must be made to our ideas (even some of those ideas held by women 
about themselves and other women) of “femininity” in order to reclaim it from 
hegemony? Can women identify a new genre of “feminine” that is not “less” and 
“lack”? 
 
An Overview of the Specular and Textual Pleasure 
 Second-wave feminist theory has been criticized for its tendency to 
generalize too much; scholars and laypersons alike are averse to any idea that 
gender is something that can be quantified or “essentialized.” According to 
Christina Hughes, second-wave feminism’s treatment of women as a “unitary 
category” ignored certain differences between women (10). In addition, third-
wave feminism sees second-wave feminism as ignoring its own very white, 
heterosexual middle-class view of feminism and its privileges. Hughes notes that 
identity politics, beginning in the 1980’s, especially called for a revision to 
second-wave’s Western, heteronormative assumptions (10). French feminist 
theories of gender and language have been seen as falling into the same 
essentialist loop; however, some French feminist theory, such as Julia Kristeva’s 
use of jouissance, which may shed some light on current linguistic and identity 
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theories related to identity and style construction.  
  According to Nikki Sullivan, “identity politics …could be said to be based 
on the assumption that sexual inclinations, practices, and desires are the 
expression of a person’s core identity” (81). But because, as Sullivan and others 
argue, identity is a social construct, gender is, as Simone de Beauvoir asserts, a 
“learned set of attributes and actions” (qtd. in Sullivan 81) which is constructed 
for the speaker, rather than by the speaker. According to Judith Butler, “(g)ender 
is the performative effect of reiterative acts…which are repeated in and through a 
highly rigid regulatory frame, (and which) ‘congeal over time to produce the 
appearance of a substance, of a natural sort of being’” (qtd. in Sullivan 82).   
Thus, linguists perceive identity as indexed through linguistic means, 
through what Penelope Eckert calls “stylistic moves” (458). Butler, too, argues 
that “(i)dentity categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether 
as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures, or as the rallying points 
for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression” (qtd. in Sullivan 82). So, 
French feminist theory and linguistic theory have—unknowingly, it seems—
danced around each other for the last fifty years or so, both referring to elements 
of language based in intertextuality and finally resting on linguistic change made 
through purposeful use of language.  
According to third-wave feminists and linguists, gender is not an 
“essential” quality, but rather a societal construct that is “always contestable,” 
because, as Mary Bucholtz (and others such as Norma Mendoza-Denton) 
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suggests, “local forms creatively respond to dominant ideologies rather than 
mechanically reflecting them” (“You Da Man” 444). Bucholtz posits that race and 
gender are both constructed “in the narrative choices of the storytellers” (“You Da 
Man” 445). Thus, this view of gender sees it as the process and the product of a 
collective narrative. Similarly moving beyond the idea of a feminine “essence,” 
body theorists such as Judith Butler argue that gender is contextual, and, 
therefore, resists definition (54-55). Linguistic theorists, too, assert the contextual 
nature of gender construction. In this thesis, I will demonstrate, using a particular 
site of language, that a very tenuous, but salient, resonance exists between 
current feminist, linguistic, and body theory on one hand, and the French 
“essentialist” feminists (or second-wave “cultural” feminists), on the other—
namely, the lyrics of musician Tori Amos, which are complex and “baffling” in the 
very style of Helene Cixous’ “The Laugh of the Medusa.”  
 
Foreground: Identity Through Stylistic Moves 
Linguists have discussed gender as a phenomenon that is styled (i.e., 
constructed and refuted) by language and other “effortful” activities (Eckert 469). 
Elinor Ochs observes that “gender ideologies are socialized, sustained, and 
transformed through talk, particularly through verbal practices that recur 
innumerable times in the lives of members of social groups,” referring to 
Althusser’s and Pascal’s ideas that human subjectivity is based in human action 
(336). Indeed, language is widely discussed in the field of linguistics as a 
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positioning of the self, the subject, through what Ochs calls “stances” and other 
“social acts” (337). For example, a woman who uses “baby talk”—high-pitched 
and simplistic sentences and vocabulary—positions herself as a mother, 
expressing a particular gendered, expected “stance” in relation to any audience 
(349). Gender becomes, in this way, an expression of social meaning (337). Of 
course, any particular gender construction is contextual. The construction of 
gender through language is variable (dependent upon context) even for one 
particular women. 
Language is contextual, referential. Therefore, a speech act that positions 
the self betrays some social information about the speaker; Ochs and others 
would identify this linguistic phenomenon as indexicality (339). And while 
language is not supposed to directly index gender, per se, it is indirectly related 
to the development of a gendered persona that might be adopted and reinforced 
by a speaker (340). In this way, commonly known linguistic markers might “recast 
the past” and “precast the future,” according to Ochs (346). However, while 
certain acts and markers exist which correspond to gender stereotypes, there are 
instances of transformation, when a particular marker or linguistic form might be 
reinterpreted over time or by various groups, lending to certain utterances a 
“multifarious signalling” [sic] (Ochs 338).  
Penelope Eckert discusses variation and the indexical field, wherein 
certain “salient” variables might operate within a “field of potential meanings—an 
indexical field, or constellation of ideologically related meanings” (454). These 
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constructed linguistic meanings, paired with other elements of style such as 
dress and gesture, feed into personae, and are an example of what Eckert would 
call enregistered voices, which “locat(e) register in continual process of 
production and reproduction” (Ochs 456). Interestingly, while Eckert asserts 
these stylistic variations may be mostly “local,” meaning they reflect and work to 
express local identities and ideologies, eventually they function as “linguistics 
signs” that connect these local identities and ideologies to the larger “political 
economy and more specifically to the demographic categories that both emerge 
from and constrain local practice” (456). Basically, then, stylistic variations are 
what Eckert calls “salient” elements in language that act as signposts in the 
semiotic chain of signification. Eckert describes these stylistic practices as a 
“bricolage [Hebdige 1984], in which individual resources (in this case, variables) 
can be interpreted and combined with other resources to construct a more 
complex meaningful identity” (457). Thus, stylistic moves become an indirect 
means of gender indexicality. And, just as Ochs refers to a “multifarious 
signalling,” Eckert argues that linguistic opposition to a certain community can be 
indexed through linguistic variables. Certain variables may even be hyper-
articulated—what Eckert calls “recursiveness”—to exert such an opposition 
(459). Variables are further used to index “authenticity” within social context 
(462). In this way, according to Eckert, variables are used to make certain 
“ideological moves” in the creation of identity. Linguistic variables, then, are 
reflective of stance, and thus are political statements because of their capacity to 
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embrace, comment on, and refute group mentalities. As Eckert states, “meanings 
associated with variables (are) based in highly salient ideological issues” (466). It 
follows that gender, as a sociolinguistic construct, is a phenomenon that can be 
refuted and assisted by politicized linguistic variants.  
Variables are, finally, closely related to power (or the lack thereof), class 
affiliation or the maintenance of or resistance to institutional alliances, and 
affiliation with or opposition to social groups (Eckert 470). Because linguistic 
variables may be linked to disparate social groups, they have immense power to 
effect change. As Eckert so poetically terms it, “all change unfolds in the course 
of day-to-day exchange, and that exchange involved local reinterpretation and 
repositioning” (472). In other words, it is in the small speech events that take 
place between people that linguistic change occurs.  
 Norma Mendoza-Denton discusses the tenuous phenomenon of identity 
indexing in the positing, using “creaky voice,” of the Chicana gang persona. 
Using the catch-phrase semiotic hitchhiking for intertextuality, Mendoza-Denton 
identifies “creak” as a contextualization cue across contexts of usage (Eckert 
would say that “creak” is a “salient” variable). Mendoza-Denton details the ways 
that “creak,” used by Chicana/o gang members originally, has now been 
appropriated by rappers in the mainstream, and how creak has also appeared in 
video games and other media—such as the internet—as an exaggerated and 
mocking racial marker (273). While “creak” itself is not a marker I will discuss in 
this thesis, “creak” is a poignant example of how “effortful” (Eckert 469) choices 
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are made in the positing of identity by individuals within a social group, and which 
can change over time to expand and transform. Mendoza-Denton writes that 
“creak,” originally used by males to indicate masculinity, first transferred to a 
feminine marker of Chicana gang members trying to keep their emotions under 
control, to appear “hardcore” (266). In the light of “creak’s” manifestation into a 
social comment (Mendoza-Denton would say this is entextualization, a 
recontextualization of a variable used in another context other than originally 
intended [269]), “creak” shows how a discourse device can be recycled and 
repurposed. In Mendoza-Denton’s words, “creak” is part of a “counterhegemonic 
gendered performance” (270). I argue there might be other ways in which women 
might entextualize gendered markers to indicate opposition to and alliance with 
the social hierarchy.     
 “Creak” is just one salient example of linguistic entextualization that 
duplicates “prior texts” while making use of double meaning and subjectivity. In 
the past century, linguists such as Deborah Tannen and Robin Lakoff and French 
feminists like Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray have conducted this very 
conversation about “feminine” ways of communicating which favor duplicity, 
complexity, and subjectivity in meaning—as opposed to the Westernized, male 
way of communicating in a short, direct, unilateral manner and a “business-like” 
tone. Thus, Mary Bucholtz, in her “Editor’s Introduction” to the revised and 
expanded edition of Robin Lakoff’s Language and Woman’s Place, clarifies that, 
for Lakoff, “ ‘woman’s language’ is not fundamentally about gender but more 
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basically about the displayed lack of power” (6). Similarly, Shari Kendall argues 
that women have held more “socializing roles, all of which involve the modeling 
of or explicit instruction in ‘ladylike’ language” (qtd. in Bucholtz, “Introduction” 7), 
reiterating the idea that “woman’s language” is implicitly taught to girls as a way 
to enter into a sort of exclusive clique, and that this language is then implicitly 
reinforced by its continued usage. Ochs’ example of baby talk is just one such 
example: baby talk is mastered by young girls from their first words, when they 
practice mothering with dolls and practice being hostesses with “tea parties.”     
 But third-wave feminism asks the world to develop new ways of identifying 
what is feminine. It asks that we address not only the white, middle-class or elite, 
Western idea of what is feminine, but to move beyond the conventional idea of 
femininity toward a much more inclusive definition of what is “woman” and what 
is “feminine,” to welcome women of all cultures, races, and “genders.” Kira Hall 
and Bucholtz, in the “Introduction” to Gender Articulated, very succinctly cover 
three major veins in philosophy regarding “woman’s language”:  
The investigation of how cultural paradigms of gender relations are 
perpetuated through language; the study of woman’s innovative 
use of language to subvert this dominant belief system; and the 
examination of how women construct social identities and 
communities that are not determined in advance by gender 
ideologies (9).  
Bucholtz and Hall refer specifically to Mendoza-Denton’s work, which recognizes 
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that “time-honored democratic institutions and practices may in fact engender 
asymmetrical power relations between men and women,” but adds that women 
are “able to draw upon counterstrategies that may serve as new methods of 
empowerment” (11). Further, they note that Mary Talbot’s “[demonstration] that 
the construction of femininity itself is a practice in which institutions and individual 
women work together, often to women’s detriment” (12). Next, Bucholtz and Hall 
note that “women as producers of language [might] resist or subvert hegemonic 
notions of gender” and “present women as agents who may defy or embrace 
gendered expectations of language behavior for their own purposes” (13). 
Finally, Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet demonstrate that “because speakers 
of every community invoke language ideologies together with their own local 
ideologies and practices in order to establish positions of power, language 
analysts must become aware of these belief systems before embarking on the 
study of discursive identity” (qtd. in Bucholtz and Hall, “Introduction” 8). Of 
course, the summative argument is that gender is societally constructed, and that 
women do not have to accept the gender definition handed down to them. 
Linguistic theory indicates that gender shows the sociolinguistic construction of 
the self: women have the power to frame and reframe society’s expectation 
through linguistic moves. 
 
Revisioning an Old Saw: Finding Peace Between 
Disparate Theoretical Approaches 
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However, French feminists have argued that femininity might be defined 
as a certain essence of plurality. Irigaray elucidates this viewpoint: 
‘She’ is indefinitely other than herself. This is doubtless why she is said to 
be whimsical, incomprehensible, agitated, capricious…not to mention her 
language, in which ‘she’ sets off in all directions leaving ‘him’ unable to 
discern the coherence of any meaning. Hers are contradictory words, 
somewhat mad from the standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever 
listens to them with ready-made grids, with a fully elaborated code in 
hand. For in what she says, too, at least when she dares, woman is 
constantly touching herself. She steps ever so slightly aside from herself 
with a murmur, an exclamation, a whisper, a sentence left 
unfinished….When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. From 
another point of pleasure, or of pain. One would have to listen with 
another ear, as if hearing an ‘other meaning’ always in the process of 
weaving itself, of embracing itself with words, but also of getting rid of 
words in order not to become fixed, congealed in them. For if ‘she’ says 
something, it is not, it is already no longer, identical with what she means. 
What she says is never identical with anything, moreover; rather, it is 
contiguous. It touches upon. And when it strays too far from that proximity, 
she breaks off and starts over at ‘zero’: her body-sex (29). 
I quote this passage at length because it reflects what Irigaray argues about the 
“body-sex;” from this passage one can infer that women are, as Irigaray puts it, 
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“plural” (28), in body and in mind. What a tall order—from this passage a woman 
might develop an inferiority complex if she were not, say, bisexual and 
schizophrenic. And yet, I hear in this somewhat parallel explication of the 
“feminine mind” alongside body-sex, something of “multifarious signalling” and of 
Mendoza-Denton’s “counterhegemonic gendered performance.” It may be that 
women have become, by necessity as subjected beings, experts at subversion 
and multiple voicing.  
 However, it may be that the issue of gender identity cannot be discussed 
without reference to the actual biological difference(s) between men and women; 
indeed, we know from linguistic and identity theory that we are all bound by 
societal traditions and expectation. But our bodies, too, are bound in this same 
way. In this vein of thought, body theory was born. Judith Butler, author of the 
seminal Bodies That Matter, posits that because of the traditional Greek 
philosophy that only a male can be a subject--which is divorced from the body as 
it transcends materiality--the concept of an identifiable “feminine” may be 
contained in the materiality of the body, having been “left behind” by societal 
conception (54-55). In other words, because (1) women throughout history have 
been denied education and citizenship by male society; (2) women have been 
seen as the origin of sin from the time of Eve’s eating of the forbidden fruit in the 
Garden of Eden; and (3) women have been tied to the work of their bodies--
namely, that of producing and caring for children; women have been denied the 
ability to transcend the body, conceptually and practically. If, then, the materiality 
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of the body is conceived as a decidedly “feminine” phenomenon, this conception 
can inform our reading of literature and society, to unearth a “feminine” 
characterized by Otherness.  
 But herein lies the rub--if third-wave feminism agrees with French 
feminism in the “plurality” of the feminine, could there not be a tenuous peace 
made between the two groups--a further clarification and reworking of their two 
approaches? Can these two theoretical perspectives become friends?  
 
The Nonthematizable, Pleasurable Other 
 For the French feminist Irigaray, the world operates according to the 
symbolic order of language, and she speaks of a “‘specular’ outside” which 
represents the “nonthematizable” area outside the male conception of the (male) 
speaking subject. If women operate as part and parcel of this “nonthematizable” 
outside, their language, too, would be characterized as “nonthematizable.”  
 Cixous’ “The Laugh of the Medusa” portrays such a “feminine” that 
welcomes communion with the Other—“togetherness with the Other”—which 
multiplies its own existence and identity, which “transform(s) by the thousands”… 
“without danger, without pain, without loss--of moments of self, of consciousness, 
of persons one has been, goes beyond, leaves. It doesn’t happen without 
expense--of sense, time, direction” (43). In other words, Cixous seems to say 
that women transcend themselves within themselves; women transcend the 
material body while occupying it. This is a novel concept; in Westernized Judeo-
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Christian society especially, the goal of the educated man has always been to 
transcend the physical bondage of the material body, to reach--or to at least 
approach--divinity by communion with God. In this light, Cixous’ remarks about 
the ability of woman to transcend the body while occupying the societal 
conception of its materiality is a literal and a figurative statement of feminine 
power, since to many women, our bodies cannot be divorced from their 
functionality. Indeed, this irrevocable tie to functionality provides the impetus for 
linguistic ideas of a “woman’s language.” But there is hope.  
  Butler suggests that “sexed” language is associated with the natural, 
leaving “sex” to represent something “pre-linguistic” to which there is no 
“immediate access.” Al Becker asserts that “The actual a-priori of any language 
event…is an accumulation of remembered prior texts” (qtd. in Tannen 37). 
Hence, style, like sex, is also thought of as “a-priori” or rooted in intertextuality 
(Tannen 37), meaning that any citational practice mimics citational practices 
which have come before it. Thus, gender, like style, might be termed an 
“accumulation of remembered texts.” If to be a woman is “natural”, then to be a 
woman is to be a versatile original, and the gendered frame of the woman is a 
copy, or the specular image of the woman (Butler 43-45). In effect, the specular 
woman is the “accumulation of remembered texts” to which Amos conspicuously 
chooses to allude. In Pleasure of the Text, Roland Barthes writes: As “language 
is redistributed…two edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing 
edge… and another edge, mobile, blank, (ready to assume any contours).” 
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Finally, by indexing multiple versions of Irigaray’s “specular” woman--the woman 
society continually frames and expects--Amos shows the versatility of the 
“natural.”  
Barthes describes the “erotic” as the “flaw” or “seam” between culture and 
its “dismantling” (6-7). Thus, in a text analyzed as skillfully, subversively 
“feminine” in style, the “edges” being created might be termed the “specular” and 
the “natural.” These edges would be marked by erotic, “pleasurable” points in the 
text in which there is a blur between the signifier and its signified.  
 What linguists and French feminists do agree on is that societal norms 
influence the modes of discourse which are acceptable; there is an undisputed 
idea that the dominant portion of society decides the accepted modes or mores 
of conversation and interaction. According to many a linguist, the “signifier,” or 
the symbol used to represent a “sign,” or physical object, is “slippery” and easily 
misread. This means that the signification of any sign is negotiable, just as the 
discursive practices used to signify it are negotiable. Thus, goes the theory, 
language, including any signifier and the discursive practices used to identify it, 
can be “co-opted” by any speaker.  
Tannen, in a chapter entitled “Repetition in Conversation: Toward a 
Poetics of Talk” refers to what she calls “prepatterning” in language, which is a 
certain “idiomaticity” or “ubiquity of prepatterned expressions per se” (38). 
Further, she argues that “it is the play between fixity [expressions which have 
been “handed-down,” so to speak, over time] and novelty [new, “original” ways of 
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patterning language] that makes possible the creation of meaning” (37). 
Stunningly, Tannen makes no reference to Julia Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic 
Language in this chapter; Kristeva’s work seems an oeuvre designed to provide 
the basis for Tannen’s thesis here. But what Tannen does refer to is a bit by 
Mikhail Bakhtin: 
Indeed, any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was 
directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, 
charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist -- or, on the 
contrary, by the ’light’ of a line of words that have already been spoken 
about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, 
alien value judgments and accents …  
The living utterance…cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living 
dialogic threads…. (I)t cannot fail to become an active participant in social 
dialogue. After all, the utterance of ideas arises out of this dialogue as a 
continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it -- it does not approach the object 
from the sidelines (qtd. in Tannen 43).  
Similarly, Leon S. Roudiez, in his introduction to the English translation of 
Kristeva’s Poetic Language, remarks that considering Kristeva‘s method of what 
he terms “textual” rather than “literary” analysis, “(t)he text that is analyzed is 
actually the effect of the dialectical interplay between semiotic and symbolic 
dispositions. Here it would be helpful to keep in mind the etymology of the word 
and think of it as texture, a ‘disposition or connection of threads, filaments, or 
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other slender bodies, interwoven’ (Webster 2)” (Roudiez 5). Kristeva asserts that 
if any text can be analyzed in this way, it means that “linguistics is opened up to 
all possible categories, including philosophy, which linguistics thought it would be 
able to escape” (Roudiez 23). Due to this attendance to a new kind of linguistics 
which would refer not to “arbitrary” semiotics and “mathematized” semiotic 
practices, Kristeva’s textual analysis might be seen as divorcing linguistics from 
traditional logic, such as that of Aristotle and Plato (Roudiez 25-26).  
 Cixous, in “The Newly Born Woman,” speaks about the same societally 
constructed “logocentrism and phallocentrism” framed by Irigaray, and she asks 
“what would happen to the order of the world if the rock upon which they founded 
this church should crumble?” (39). Similar to Cixous’ idea of a “crumbling “of 
logocentricsm is Kristeva’s idea that a “shattering of discourse” can occur within 
language. According to Kristeva, “linguistics changes constitute changes in the 
status of the subject” (15). In Kristeva’s view, this “shattering” enables 
participants in language to see the signifying process for what it is: a visibility 
within culture. Finally, she asks to what extent this “shattering” is itself “always 
already written”? Kristeva asks, “Under what conditions does (this shattering of 
discourse become   indispensable, censured, repressed, or marginal?… And 
under what conditions does it remain a blind alley, a harmless bonus offered by a 
social order which uses this ‘esoterism’ to expand, become flexible, and thrive?” 
(16). The idea that second-wave feminism, thought to be so old-fashioned, can 
have been on the cusp of something so modern as indexicality is stunning. Can a 
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woman repurpose her body, even herself, through linguistic variables? 
 
Barthes: Pleasure, Intertextuality, and Desire 
 Notably, both Kristeva and Tannen refer to the idea that the text is “always 
already written.” In short, Barthes is high in the minds of both Kristeva and 
Tannen. And in the end, it is Barthes’ theory of intertextuality that provides the 
centrifuge for the theories I explicate here -- to show a possible place for a non-
essentialist, revisionist-type of “feminine” style.  
But which is it? Is linguistics a “mathematized” science moderated by 
“language doctors,” such as that which Kristeva’s very doctorate would describe 
her? Have we, in recognizing Kristeva’s “anti-logic” of sorts, left behind Aristotle 
and Plato? Or is it, as Tannen asserts in “Repetition in Conversation: Toward a 
Poetics of Talk,” that “language is less freely generated, more pre-patterned, 
than most current linguistic theory acknowledges” (49)? Tannen does offer a 
deceptively simple solution to this conundrum: “It is the play between fixity 
[prepatterned phrases and language formulas] and novelty [new takes on old 
phrases, new combinations of words or mixed formulas] that makes possible the 
creation of meaning” (49). And Amos makes use of this interplay between fixity 
and novelty as a jumping-off point: a pathway to “bliss.” 
 Barthes writes in The Pleasure of the Text about the “redistribution” of 
language, in which he posits that two edges are formed: “an obedient, 
conformist, plagiarizing edge…and another edge, mobile, blank (ready to 
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assume any contours)” (6). This blank edge he sees as “the place where the 
death of language is glimpsed” (6). “The site of a loss, the seam, the cut, the 
deflation, which seizes the subject in the midst of bliss” (6). If, as Barthes asserts, 
culture is an edge, blissful language rubs against this edge. In this blissful text, 
as in poetry, or in Amos’ case, lyrics, “the text no longer has the sentence as its 
model” (6), and the edge will be clearest in “its lexicon, its metrics, its prosody” 
(6). The text will be a “powerful gush of words, a ribbon of infra-language” (6). 
But Barthes explains that this more raw edge will collide with the language of 
tradition, such as “(decasyllabic) meter, of assonance, of plausible neologisms, of 
prosodic rhythms, of (quoted) truisms” (7). In other words, culture-language 
history and usage is the other edge created by the blissful text--the “age-old 
culture of the signifier” (7). If I can identify the edges created by a blissful text, 
then I might glimpse the “dismantling of language” which “is intersected by 
political assertion” (7). In other words, I might prove that a bliss-ful text could 
change that very culture.  
 What is more, Barthes refers to intertextuality. In the way that Barthes 
describes the function of the blissful text, he seems to say that a blissful text 
makes use of the ways in which words and phrases and rhythms have been used 
before. Barthes’ intertextuality is somewhat synonymous with Kristeva’s term 
transposition, which, she explains, is the process of the unconscious whereby a 
term, phrase, or other textual artifact is “pass(ed) from one sign system to 
another” (59).  
20 
 According to Kristeva, poetic language has the potential to displace or 
“breach” the thetic, or posited subject, through mimetic language (57), or 
language that mimics and makes use of the symbolic order. In Kristeva’s view, 
mimetic language displaces the thetic when it--through transgression of 
grammatical rules--destroys not only denotation, or the representation of an 
object, but also meaning itself, posited by the speaking subject (57).  
 These ideas are easily readable: what Kristeva refers to as the 
“enunciating subject” is necessary to found and to sustain the symbolic order. If 
the subject is subverted by poetic language, the symbolic order is disrupted. 
Meaning “shatters” in the face of an “instinctual glossolalia” (58). In other words, 
when meaning is displaced by prosody and grammar transgression, there can be 
revolution in poetic language because, as Kristeva puts it, “mimesis and poetic 
language…go through [the thetic’s] truth (signification, denotation) to tell the 
‘truth’ about it’ (60)—when grammar and semantic rules are broken, the 
(patriarchal) structure that animates language can be exposed at its root. 
 Interestingly, Kristeva delves into theology in her discussion of the 
implications of such language revolution; “on the strength of their confrontation 
with Bedeutung (denotation and signification), mimesis and poetic language 
“assume the right to enter into the social debate” (61). But, she adds, the debate 
is more than social; it is theological, because, she writes, mimesis and poetic 
language may prevent the “theologization” of the thetic (61), acting as “protestors 
against [religion’s] posturing” (61). In other words, grammar, syntax, signification-
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-all the rules of language--are not divine. Instead, these linguistic rules are 
cultural mores, which can be tested and refuted; however, these rules are 
thought to be of divine source -- and of divine consequence -- in any language 
system, as Kristeva argues. 
 The moment in which the thetic is confronted by jouissance is what 
Kristeva calls sacrifice, in which the symbolic order is reinforced (78). According 
to Kristeva, all linguistic systems contain sacrifice, as a celebration, not of 
violence, but as a celebration of “the positing of violence, the ‘boundary to the 
infinite’ which, though fragile under the attack of violence, violates and calls upon 
violence, thus constituting a precarious but indispensable guarantor of its 
accomplishment” (79). In other words, sacrifice exists in linguistic systems to 
bound the thetic—to reinforce boundaries to the always-already thematized. 
Kristeva posits that sacrifice stands directly in opposition to art or poetry—or 
lyrics in music, as it were—in which the symbolic order is dissolved or shot 
through with its own precariousness, in which the fragility of the signification 
process, or thesis, is revealed not to be divine, but instead posited and unstable.  
 
Do Purple Bodies Matter?: Bodies By Butler 
 Taking into account the concept of the thetic with that of gender identity, 
Butler remarks that it is easy to “[fall] into the trap of cultural determinism” while 
trying to weigh the importance of the “constitutive and compelling status of 
gender norms” (x), and argues that bodies only “figure”—“only appear, only 
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endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered 
regulatory schemas” (xi). Further, she argues that “[t]o claim that sex is already 
gendered, already constructed, is not to explain in which way the ‘materiality’ of 
sex is forcibly produced” (xi). Butler’s remarks here tellingly coincide with those of 
Kristeva as she writes about the breach of the thetic:  
The semiotic’s breach of the symbolic in so-called poetic practice 
can probably be ascribed to the very unstable yet forceful positing 
of the thetic. In our view, the analysis of texts shows that thetic 
lability is primarily a problem with imaginary captation 
(…scopophilia, the need for a mirror or an identifying addressee, 
etc) and a resistance to the discovery of castration (thereby 
maintaining the phallic mother who usurps the place of the Other) 
(63).  
Taking both of these remarks into account, one might say “sex” is an example of 
the “very unstable, yet forceful positing of the thetic,” which according to Kristeva, 
“gives rise to ‘fantasies’” and “attempt[s] to dissolve the first social censorship--
the bar between signifier and signified“--even as it “fail[s] to prevent the 
constitution of the symbolic” (63). Kristeva notes that in this event, “[l]anguage 
thus tends to be drawn out of its symbolic function (sign-syntax) and is opened 
out within a semiotic articulation” (63). This is the “irruption of the semiotic chora.” 
When irruption takes place, signs seem to stand for new things, or they stand for 
their language histories, not for the objects they were meant to signify.  
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 When this irruption takes place in what Kristeva calls poetic language, 
there is the possibility for jouissance--poetic language “introduce[s] through the 
symbolic that which works on, moved through, and threatens it” (81). In short, 
grammar, syntax, and signification represent what is “thematizable” for the 
culture in which a language is used; when poetic language is used, these rules 
are broken,  creating an erotic “seam” (to borrow from Barthes) that disrupts the 
signification practices of the culture, while allowing poetic language to comment 
on, revise, and refigure the signifying culture’s language. Kristeva remarks: “In 
contrast to sacrifice, poetry shows us that language lends itself to the penetration 
of the socio-symbolic by jouissance, and that the thetic does not necessarily 
imply theological sacrifice” (80). In other words, when jouissance occurs, 
grammar, syntax, and language are plainly revealed as cultural iconography 
rather than divinely inspired edicts.  
 How do jouissance and the theologization of the thetic figure the feminine? 
Wordplay, multiple meanings, and the blurring of meaning reaffirm that culture 
can be reshaped, and that their shape is a cultural phenomenon. If sex, then, is a 
societal construction, sex is something that can reshaped, revisioned. 
 Butler asks: “What are the constraints by which bodies are materialized as 
‘sexed,’ and how are we to understand the ‘matter’ of sex, and of bodies more 
generally, as the repeated and violent circumscription of cultural intelligibility? 
Which bodies come to matter--and why?” (xii). And her answer is simply that 
through language participation and through tacit acceptance of societal rules and 
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mores, some of which have been handed down to us from the days of Plato and 
Aristotle. Kristeva writes that “the sacred—sacrifice —which is found in every 
society, is, then, a theologization of the thetic, itself structurally indispensable to 
the positing of language” (78). According to Butler, the Western world’s reliance 
upon the logic of these two philosophers—Plato and Aristotle—for its system of 
logic and persuasion shapes our ideas of who can speak—of who is visible in our 
culture. Aristotle’s idea of matter: “‘[M]atter is potentiality [dyanameos], form 
actuality.’ In reproduction, women are said to contribute matter; men, the form” 
(qtd. in Butler 31). Thus, as Butler explains, “insofar as matter is clearly defined 
by a certain capacity to originate and to compose that for which it supplies the 
principle of intelligibility, then matter is clearly defined by a certain power of 
creation and rationality” (32).  Butler continues: “For Aristotle the soul designates 
the actualization of matter, where matter is understood as fully potential and 
unactualized” (32). In other words, Butler remarks, matter “only appears under a 
certain grammatical form” and its intelligibility “is indissoluble from what 
constitutes its matter” (33). What Butler means here is that the form of the human 
body has, in some manner, shaped the grammar and syntax used to describe it. 
 Next, Butler refers to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, wherein he 
describes the soul as “an instrument of power through which the body is 
cultivated and formed” or “a power-laden schema that produces and actualizes 
the body itself” (33). In other words, without the soul invested with power, the 
body is not actualized, does not figure or read as visible in our culture (34-35). 
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Indeed, if we rely upon these two for our traditions for signification, the only 
subject can be male. And this is a crucial point for bodies that matter, even for 
people who matter—people who signify. If a body cannot be linked to a soul 
invested with power, the body itself is depreciated, unimportant.  
 
A Final Note: Feminine Identity Styling/Performance 
 Butler, commenting on the performativity of gender, asks: “If I [persist] in 
this notion that bodies [are] constructed, perhaps I really thought that words 
alone had the power to craft bodies from their own linguistic substance?” (x). 
According to Kate McCarthy, “the female body is presented not only as a locus of 
oppression, but as a kind of performance site, where cultural expectations about 
gender are rehearsed … manipulated and resisted” (70). Similarly, then, gender 
is conceived as performative, where the body as a site of performance becomes 
doubly significant in meaning and power. But Butler addresses the problems with 
this conception in the “Introduction” to Bodies That Matter: 
…(I)f I were to argue that genders are performative, that could 
mean that I thought that one woke up in the morning, perused the 
closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, donned 
that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place 
at night. Such a willful and instrumental object, one who decides on 
its gender, is clearly not its gender from the start and fails to realize 
that its existence is already decided by gender. Certainly, such a 
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theory would restore a figure of a choosing subject--humanist--at 
the center of a project whose emphasis on construction seems to 
be quite opposed to such a notion (x). 
What Butler stipulates here is that gender cannot only be seen as performance; 
that is, gender is not a choice. Gender is constructed for the speaker; it is a 
collocation of meanings taken together as an identity marker—a set of 
“remembered texts.” Indeed, Butler argues that the only agency a speaker can 
have is to “be constituted in and by the signifier, where ‘to be constituted’ means 
‘to be compelled to repeat or cite or mime’ the signifier itself” (220).    
 
Musical Artists in General and Amos in Particular 
 Musical artists quintessentially comment on and break societal 
expectation. Joanne Hollows discusses popular culture’s capability to “make over 
the popular” (190). But Amos isn’t the only female artist making over the feminine 
image. Karina Eileraas, along with Lori Burns and Melissa LeFrance, authors of 
Disruptive Divas, and Sheila Whiteley, author of Women and Popular Music, 
investigate the ways that popular media icons such as Fiona Apple, Courtney 
Love, Pink, Gwen Stefani, and Tori Amos, along with other feminine punk, rock, 
ska and other artists play with the societal idea of the female image by 
“performing ugliness,” subverting the societal expectation that they exhibit girlish 
“prettiness,” while breaking cultural boundaries.  
 Amos is distinct here, however, in that her lyrics might be said to redefine 
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the terms on which we base what “feminine” means, and it is through her lyrics, 
more than through the lyrics of other artists, that I see correspondence between 
this a priori gut-feeling I have about her work, and the linguistic and feminist 
theories I use here to analyze her lyrics. Moreover, historically speaking, I argue 
that women have become masters at manipulating a dualistic “edge” through 
their linguistic and “feminine” discursive practices, and that Amos’ lyrics are a 
signpost for these discursive practices. (Maybe that is why so many women 
connect with the lyrics of Amos.) Finally, if Amos, as a woman and as a 
performer, is using the “phallocentric” language of dominant discourse, she may 
decide to mix it up. But given also that Amos figures “outside” the land of male 
specular-ity, she herself is as slippery as, say, the famous “woman behind the 
wallpaper” in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s famous work “The Yellow Wallpaper.” In 
fact, her status as a performer makes her linguistic decisions all the more 
poignant, effective, and overall, more damaging to logocentrism.   
It is this “crumbling” alluded to by Cixous—the bringing down of 
logocentrism, which Amos’ lyrics accomplish through their subversion of words 
and their meaning within Amos’ sphere. Amos works with words to blur, mute, 
and revise their meanings. This muddying corresponds to Cixous’ definition of 
writing for women: “Writing is woman’s…woman admits there is an 
other….Writing is the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the dwelling place of 
the other in me.” Writing “gives neither rest nor security, always disturbs the 
relationship to ‘reality,’ produces an uncertainty that gets in the way of the 
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subject’s socialization” (42). Thus, the lyrics of Amos disrupt notions of femininity, 
and, with “other-ness”—these lyrics do the work of de-socialization. 
 Taken together, Amos’ oeuvre represents three stages in the feminine 
body’s actualization. First, there is girlhood and shyness, and self-hatred incited 
by the inevitable wounds inflicted upon her for the reason of her femininity. Here, 
the wounding results in shame. Here, too, a girl develops her “breadcrumbs,” her 
only means of signification while maintaining her feminine place. In the second 
stage, the woman begins to manufacture signs who she is 
beneath/behind/through the specular image placed on her. This stage is 
characterized by sexual experimentation, rage and raving as she begins to 
realize her “bounded”-ness. In the third and final stage, the woman becomes an 
actualized body, independent of the need for a phallus. She successfully wields 
poetic language to achieve jouissance. She develops any one of several paths to 
this independence, in which she breaks through/beyond the specular image. In 
this stage, either/or thinking is replaced by both/and/all-together logic and in 
which old schematic and thematic ruts are eradicated in favor of a “new,” 
inclusive and actualized “feminine” style. I am using “Mother” and “Girl,” and 
“Cloud On My Tongue” to explicate the first stage in the development;  
“Professional Widow” and “Code Red” to explicate the second stage; and “Velvet 
Revolution,” “Body and Soul,” and  “Dragon” to explicate the third and final stage.  
 
Case In Point 
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 According to Irigaray, the “body”--the “feminine” body--is “the site of 
inscription that cannot be explicitly thematized” (qtd. in Butler 38). Thus, as Butler 
states, the feminine is…nonthematizable materiality” (42). In Amos’ “Purple 
People” the speaker reflects, “just when you escape/ you have yourself to fear;” 
to find or define oneself as a woman is to tolerate an inaccurate specular identity-
-a specular definition, denoted by a signifier/signified blur--and yet, to place 
oneself outside the male system of representation is to have no signification 
whatsoever. Thus, when the speaker asks, “Do you do judo when they surround 
you,” she implies the split of the body from masculine historicity--the “lily-white 
matricide of vicious words.” The “natural” body, exiled from the specular woman, 
is banished from matter, and thus, from meaning (Butler 32). 
I watch me be this other thing, i never know 
if I’m marooned or where the purple people go 
then lily white matricide from vicious words 
it doesn’t leave a scratch so therefore no one’s hurt.  
Next, the speaker muses, “I watch me be this other thing and I never know/ if I’m 
marooned or where the purple people go.” Here, “the lily-white matricide of 
vicious words” is slippery, because according to Irigaray’s theory of iteration, 
when a woman utters herself, she iterates phallogocentric speech that erases her 
even as she is expressed. In addition, because the mother signifies as less than 
a person, “it doesn’t leave a scratch so therefore, no one’s hurt.”  
 The speaker in “Purple People” asks whether the specular “thunder,” a 
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sound that “wishes it could be the snow,” or physical sign, can be expelled by the 
woman through “a little mental yoga,” enabling her to enjoy the natural “gifts” of 
the actualized body that exist “for her, for you, for me.” This realization of the 
actualized body found in Amos’ lyrics--the “explicitly nonthematiz(able)” body, the 
site of immateriality--is boldly indexed through linguistic identity styling, which 
ultimately reads as a poignant example of a salient, various “feminine” body 
come to matter.  
 In my next chapter, I will elucidate how theories of gender, femininity, and 
the “feminine” body come-to-matter come to fruition in certain sites in Amos’ 
oeuvre. I will prove through detailed analysis that not only do Amos lyrics perform 
gender, but they also achieve “bliss” a lá Barthes, through which irruption of the 
semiotic chora, and thus, the feminine body come to matter, are discernible. 
Might a feminine body come-to-matter—signifying as an original and not as a 
part or as a copy—implicate strict revisions to our logical systems? How can we 
reconceive the “feminine” and what it means in our culture to be perceived as 
“feminine”? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EXPLICATION 
 
 
Stage One--Mother, Shame, and the Wound 
The French feminist idea of a “feminine” language—language that would 
defy “patrilinear” rules of language use (Kristeva)—implies social and linguistic 
language change. Amos’ lyrics provide a very specific example of such language 
change as Kristeva suggests, and while she indexes various female personae in 
her work, she does not favor an essentialist definition of what it is to be 
‘feminine.” Rather, she accomplishes a certain “double voicing” similar to that 
mentioned by Bucholtz (“You Da Man” 450), wherein the “hegemonic 
masculine”—and the hegemonic feminine, for that matter—is referenced, called 
to task, and refuted. Sociolinguistic theorists such as Bucholtz, Kira Hall, and Ben 
Rampton have teased out the relationship between gender and hegemony, 
arguing that gender identity “occupies a hegemonic position in a given pattern of 
gender relations “ of which “only a certain subset are acceptable” (“You Da Man,” 
Bucholtz 444). While no gender identity is “monolithic,” certain gender identities, 
in particular contexts, are figured as “feminine,” while others are not.  
Further, Eckert, Ochs, and Mendoza-Denton have discussed how certain 
“salient variables” may be used to make stylistic moves, to create and revision 
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identity, to position the self as “authentic” within one group while positioning the 
self against another group. Through the process of entextualization, which relies 
on Barthes’ theories of intertextuality, Eckert argues that variables can be used to 
transform one’s identity, and that these same variables might transform in their 
meaning over time. As Eckert asserts, “Participation in discourse involves a 
continual interpretation of forms in context, an in-the-moment assigning of 
indexical values to linguistic forms” (463), and even “(a) word’s denotation can 
absorb connotations through associations with aspects of the context in which it 
was used and most certainly, stances” (464). While Kristeva notes in her 
discussion of jouissance that the signifier is shown to be unstable—it signifies 
“multiply” or in ways that are “blurred” when used purposefully to expose the 
hidden prejudices inherent in the signification process—Eckert sees the signifier 
as changeable, as an unstable sign within the unstable, yet fixed (by repeated 
citation) sign-chain of signification. Thus, one might say that signification is an 
interplay of fixed and unfixed forces—a mixture of language devices used 
purposefully, which stabilizes and destabilizes the sign-chain itself. I argue that it 
is in just this way that a “feminine” style, especially in artistic works, might be 
identified; a persona is indexed through alliances with and against certain social 
groups, in which one makes use of an implicit understanding of salient variables, 
semiotic hitchhikers. Moreover, though this use of semiotic hitchhikers, language 
change at the level of signification can occur; new/unstable identities indexed 
and formed; and language tradition contested, even as it is being cited. 
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In this chapter, I will flesh out the three stages of development toward an 
actualization of the “feminine” represented in Amos’ work, as I see it. Using 
Butler’s body theory, French feminist theory—especially that of Kristeva and 
Irigaray, and the theories of intertextuality (i.e., language threads) as discussed 
by Barthes and Tannen, I will clarify several poignant moments in Amos’ work 
that exemplify moments of “feminine” style. Precisely at these moments, too, are 
moments of semiotic “hitchhiking” and identity indexing such as Mendoza-Denton 
and Eckert describe. Thus, the moments of intertextuality become moments of 
the sort of jouissance that Kristeva would term “revolution in poetic language,” or 
an activist brand of “feminine” style.   
 
“Mother” and Barthes 
 Susan Bordo notes in her “Introduction” to Unbearable Weight that the 
“continuing power and pervasiveness of certain cultural images” have led women 
to “internalize (an) ideology” of guilt, which “festers into unease with our 
femaleness, shame over our bodies, and self-loathing” (8). It is this “ideology of 
guilt” which characterizes the first stage of a woman’s development; she learns 
how the world works, and she learns her own (subjective) place in it. Specifically, 
women are shamed, even as they have been allowed signification—as Kristeva 
or Butler might say—only as an “outside,” divorced from mattering. Just as in 
“Purple People,“ in which the feminine body is promised its materiality, Amos’ 
“Mother” presents a similar image—the mother as a the body or the chora, as 
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Butler terms it (41)—but also as a site of pleasure (Barthes 6).  
Go, go, go, go now 
Out of the nest it’s time 
Go, go, go go now 
Circus girl 
Without a safety net 
Here here here here now 
Don’t cry 
You raised your hand for the assignment 
Tuck those ribbons under 
Your helmet  
Be a good soldier  
First my left foot 
Then my right behind the other 
Pantyhose running in the cold 
Here, the mother has been equalized with the chora (that image which is only 
fixed [by language] in the mind and cannot change, and cannot signify). Although 
the mother as the chora represents the constant who will remain after being 
entered and left (Butler 41) –who will “leave the light on”—presumably, for the 
daughter, the speaker, leaving to “dance with him”—and who begins by telling 
her daughter to “go out of the nest/it’s time,” she still instructs her daughter to 
“tuck those ribbons under (her) helmet/be a good soldier.” This pleasurable edge 
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could signify in several different ways: the speaker may be asking the girl to “tuck 
her ribbons under” to avoid being seen as a girl; or, rather, it may be that she is 
to simply remain strong as she goes into the battlefield, a place reserved 
traditionally for men. This “Mother” may herself be a “plagiarizing” and 
“conforming” edge, or is she an edge “ready to assume any contours” (Barthes 
6)? Of course, the mother may be simply advising her daughter to be strong in 
the face of offenses against her femininity, or this mother may simply hope her 
daughter will participate in society by properly “lik(ing) the dancing”, and by 
marrying and having children, as a “good girl” should do. In short, the “girl” in this 
song may conform, or she may adopt a male persona—further, she may decide 
on something in between, a gender-identification of her own construction.  
“Go, go, go, go now/out of the nest/ it’s time,” urges the mother. What time 
signifies in this first verse? It may be time to breach the thetic, or is it “time” for 
the girl to become a woman by participating in her own destruction/erasure? The 
helmet may be “just a helmet,” as Freud might say -- or it may be a phallus. This 
may be a way in which the feminine “transgresses” or is “excessive” (Irigaray 28-
33). This girl may misbehave, or she may simply learn how to be in her 
(woman’s) body—to make it conform to expectation—in this (man’s) world. 
 The guilt-ridden ideology referred to by Bordo is apparent most readily in 
Amos’ second verse: 
I walked into your dream 
And now I've forgotten how to dream my own dream 
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You are the clever one aren't you 
Brides in veils for you 
We told you all of our secrets 
All but one 
So don't you even try 
The phone has been disconnected 
Dripping with blood 
And with time 
And with your advice 
Poison me against the moon 
In other words, women have been taught to view their own bodies with shame: 
as young girls, women learn to be embarrassed by their parts and bodily 
functions—the menstrual cycle—because their bodies have always been the 
reason for their subjection. Further, because young women have been taught to 
internalize a male fear or hatred for the female form/body/functionality, the 
speaker muses: “I walked into your dream/and now I’ve forgotten how to dream/ 
my own dream,” she refers to hegemonic practices, e.g. marriage—“brides in 
veils,” “he’s gonna change my name”—which have shaped her idea of herself as 
a “successful” woman (mother and wife) that represents the societal ideal. 
Kristeva writes about the idea of “sacrifice,” in which a symbolic replacement of 
violence for a specific violent act of murder reinforces the symbolic order. In 
some way, the “girl” at the center of the narrative in Amos’ “Girl” represents the 
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sacrifice women must make to reinforce the symbolic order of society—father, 
mother, child—or the posited thetic, bounded and reproduced by the chora (72-
81).  
 Further, the speaker accuses, “we told you all of our secrets/all but one/so 
don’t you even try.” I argue that the secret to which she refers is that of how 
women create life.  But instead “The phone has been disconnected/dripping with 
blood/ and with time and with your advice/poison me against the moon” because 
women are “poisoned” against themselves by hegemonic practices, which fault 
them for their bodies because of their functionality, their capability of producing 
life.  
 The functionality of the female body is what has classically linked it to its 
status as specular--as what Irigaray terms as “outside” the scope of male 
representation. If to be male is to be, for example, made in the image of God, 
then to be a woman is to be something else, something “outside” or, as Kristeva 
proposes, “nonthematizable” (qtd. in Butler 42).   
 In the coda, the speaker muses:  
I escape into your escape 
into our very favorite fearscape 
it’s across the sky and I cross my heart 
and I cross my legs  
oh my God.  
Here the speaker refers not only to the specular “outside” but also to its lack of 
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signification, or possibly to the “woman’s world” as represented by Mary 
Wollstonecraft, wherein “from their infancy (women are taught) that beauty is 
woman’s scepter, the mind shapes itself to the body, and running around its gilt 
cage, only seeks to adorn its prison” (qtd. in Bordo 18), resulting in what Pat 
Manairdi might term the senseless and irrelevant “‘micropractices’ of everyday 
life” for women (qtd. in Bordo 18), such as “breadcrumbs lost under the snow.”   
 These micropractices Amos refers to result in what Irigaray’s catachresis, 
or “an improper transfer of sense” (qtd. in Butler 37) because as Lakoff notes:  
…a girl is damned if she does, damned if she doesn’t. If she 
refuses to talk like a lady, she is ridiculed and subjected to criticism 
as unfeminine; is she does learn, she is ridiculed as unable to think 
clearly, unable to take part in a serious discussion: in some sense, 
as less than fully human. These two choices which a woman has--
to be less than a woman or less than a human--are highly painful 
(Language and Woman’s Place 41).  
In other words, an “improper transfer of sense happens” when what is purported 
to be “woman’s language,” or sometimes what is a women’s activity, such as 
leaving breadcrumbs on the ground for the birds, becomes covered with the 
specular—in this case, the snow. In this way, women’s language and women’s 
identity markers--these “micro practices” referred to so poignantly by 
Wollstonecraft--become symbolic of repression and become “co-opted” 
(Bucholtz), using language that Barthes would say is pleasurable for both its 
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“plagiari(sm)” and its “unbounded…contours” (6).  
 Amos’ speaker indexes the specular and its outside as she describes a 
girl who seems lost in the shadows. But what are the shadows, exactly?  
from in the shadow she calls 
and in the shadow she 
finds a way finds a way 
and in the shadow she crawls 
clutching her faded photograph 
my image under her thumb 
yes with a message for my heart 
yes with a message for my heart 
The woman crawling “in the shadows” is separated from historicity by the male 
specular ideal, but still “clutching her faded photograph,” which, ironically, the 
speaker of the song says is her very own image. The crawling woman may speak 
for all women who long to find feminine expression. The photograph might be the 
feminine body, come to matter. The speaker here seems here to speak for all 
women, and yet for no one in particular.  
 The speaker promises a redemption of sorts: “She’s been everybody 
else’s girl/maybe one day she’ll be her own.” In other words, one day soon, 
specular femininity may be invested with materiality, may become visible in our 
culture. Ironically, this materiality seems to come to fruition through the poetic 
language of these very lyrics.  
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 The next verse in the song is a salient example of the “instinctual 
glossolalia” Kristeva refers to as poetic language.  
And in the doorway they stay 
and laugh as violins fill with water 
screams from the bluebells 
can’t make them go away 
well I’m not seventeen 
but I’ve cuts on my knees 
falling down as the winter 
takes one more cherry tree 
In this verse, the young woman realizes that she is effectively on a stage, to wit, 
the specular stage—where she is being closely watched by phallogocentric 
society for signs of womanhood. She is painfully aware that she is being labeled 
as a woman, and the cuts on her knees are already a sign of the actual process 
of being taken for a woman. Specifically, “as the winter takes one more cherry 
tree” might refer to her virginity being taken from her as she is bent over--thusly, 
the cuts on her knees. In a sense, the verse serves to speak of the collateral 
damages1 of being identified and labeled as a woman in phallogocentric society, 
which begin at a very young age, “not seventeen.” Reading this verse in the 
context of collateral damages, one might say the “screams from the bluebells”--a 
                                                          
1
 These damages may be assumed to be an inferiority or misogyny complex, low self-esteem, self-loathing, 
and, of course, rape. 
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woman’s attempts to break the bounds of language or of her signification as 
female--are not only regarded as craziness, but they are regarded as 
nonsensical; ergo, the lyrics of Tori Amos. Indeed, the phrases used here—
“screams from the bluebells,” “violins fill with water,” and “takes one more cherry 
tree”—are performing what Kristeva and Barthes would refer to as “plagiarism” 
and “blank[ness].” While their signification is by no means certain, their 
intertextuality causes them to signify in new ways, creating a jouissance in which 
the message of feminine historicity is boldly visible, even if ambiguous or 
“unbounded.”  
 Linguistically, the intertextuality of a phrase such as “on my knees” or an 
object such as a cherry tree are what Mendoza-Denton might term “semiotic 
hitchhikers”—images and well-known markers indicating sexual acts performed 
by or on women. But these two pieces of language are “salient variables” used 
by Amos, I would argue, to make a comment. Instead of derision toward a 
woman performing a specific sexual act (such as the derision felt by a group of 
men talking about these acts being performed), the listener feels a vague 
disgust, as if truly “seeing” these things for the first time. What is more, any 
frequent listener to Amos can feel a certain subversive mockery of gendered 
stereotypes in her work. Just as Mendoza-Denton notes that “creak” has become 
part of a stereotypical—to the point of mockery—characteristic of chola behavior 
indicating prejudice (“Creaky Voice” 272), so “on my knees” and the image of the 
cherry tree have become derisive elements in a very female—thus, very 
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“feminine”—sexual historicity, in a Western, Judeo-Christian society prejudiced 
against femaleness.      
 The last verse of the song completes the image of the girl as she comes to 
full realization of her staid place in society. Here, she comes to terms with her 
lack of signification: 
And in the mist there she rides 
and castles are burning in my heart 
and as I twist I hold tight 
and I ride to work 
every morning wondering why 
‘sit in the chair and be good now’ 
and become all that they told you 
the white coats enter her room2 
and I’m callin’ my baby 
callin’ my baby callin’ my baby callin’ 
“Castles,” though they may be nice for fairy tales, do not exist in the real world. At 
this stage, the “speaker-girl” is disillusioned by what she has been told her life will 
mean. Rather, she realizes her life is bound by constraints of her gender and her 
body. She cannot, at this point, break out of her place, though she has ceased to 
believe the story she has been told about herself and her identity as a woman. 
                                                          
2
 While it is easily perceived that the “white coats” are psychiatrists, who are remembered historically for 
offhandedly classifying women as insane, I am interested in focusing on the more theoretical rather than the 
pat readings of Tori Amos’ oeuvre.  
43 
What she has been told, she realizes, is the fairy tale. Thus, the “burning” of the 
castles.  
 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich remarked that “seldom do well-behaved women 
make history.” And the speaker has been told to behave, which she apparently 
has not done, by the end of the verse. But her behavior leaves her flat; she finds 
no meaning in it, and she finds herself misrepresented when she is represented 
at all--“and I ride to work every morning/wondering why.” Moreover, the speaker’s 
“wondering why” can be taken as a lack of sense, or an improper transfer of 
sense--the very catachresis which is referenced earlier in the song by the 
“breadcrumbs lost under the snow.” For example, the reader seems not meant to 
understand the signification of the speaker’s wondering why she is going to work. 
She wonders why she has been asked to be a good girl, or why she has 
complied with the request to behave. Or, finally, she wonders why her thoughts, 
as woman’s language, are trivialized even as they are expressed. Possibly she 
simply has no acceptable mode to correctly and accurately express herself in a 
phallogocentric society which brands every word that comes out of her mouth as 
a “sign” of her femininity, and thus, her inferiority. Certainly, the micropractices 
mentioned in the coda—“sit in the chair and be good,” “ride to work,” and 
“become all they told you”—figure as new, even meaning-less phrases, even 
given their intertextuality in the context of the Women’s Rights movement and its 
call to women “to have it all,” to divorce themselves from the material work of 
their bodies and to figure in the workforce.  
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 “Cloud on My Tongue,” too, offers the perspective of a girl growing into a 
woman, with the promise that she will find the signification she seeks. In same 
way that “Girl” raises questions of the meaning in micropractices, “Cloud on My 
Tongue” also refigures meaningful “feminine” activities: 
someone’s knockin on my kitchen door 
leave the wood outside, what 
all the girls here are freezing cold 
leave me with your borneo 
i don’t need much to keep me warm 
Here, the speaker asks that she is remembered as the specular when she tells 
the listener to “leave me with your borneo,” to remember her as he would like to 
remember her—as a girl in the kitchen, delegating the task of bringing in wood 
for the fire. This verse also acts as a stance—the speaker identifies herself as a 
woman acting in a traditional role by locating herself in the kitchen. As Eckert 
notes, “we construct a social landscape through the segmentation of the social 
terrain, and we construct a linguistic landscape through a segmentation of the 
linguistic practices in that terrain” (455). By indexing the kitchen, the speaker 
segments the social terrain; once she has done this important work to create the 
persona, she can make certain stylistic moves to comment on the terrain.  
 Next, the speaker refers to the “horror” of the sex that “is not one” 
(Irigaray). Here, there is a cunning interplay of double meaning, in which the 
“ugly one” can read as the female genitalia--the sex which is characterized by 
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“lack”--or as the girl in transition to womanhood; the proverbial “ugly duckling” to 
the swan.  
don’t stop now what you’re doing 
what you’re doing my ugly one 
bring them all here 
hard to hide a hundred girls in your hair 
it won’t be fair if i hate her 
if i ate her 
you can go now 
Having positioned herself in the kitchen, the speaker can speak for herself and 
other women, too, who are trying to come to terms with their sexuality or with 
their transition into womanhood. Here, the speaker is already changing— 
“already in there”—meaning she retains the capability to become her own 
person, to signify as a person and as an actualized feminine body.  
 The middle and end of the verse furthers the Irigarayan symbolism of the 
“horror” of “lack” (“This Sex Which Is Not One,” 23). For example, the hair hiding 
a hundred girls might even refer to the pubic hair; the hatred of the girl— “it won’t 
be fair if I hate her/if I ate her”—to a self-hatred of the specular outside, the girl 
she is becoming, whose body is not sanctioned, or “nonthematizable.” Of course, 
this couplet also refers to the horror of lack, a fear of being “swallowed up” by the 
enveloping female sex organ. According to Irigaray: “(A woman’s) desire is often 
interpreted, and feared, as a sort of insatiable hunger, a voracity that will swallow 
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you whole” (“This Sex Which is Not One,” 29). Finally, the Irigarayan idea of 
autoeroticism is implied with the line “you can go now.” The girl realizes that she 
is, in fact, capable of stimulating herself by herself. She has two lips which “touch 
each other all the time” (Irigaray 26).  
 Furthermore, the semiotic hitchhiker yet again appears, in the mention of 
“in your hair.” Having positioned herself in the kitchen, the speaker can use “hair” 
as a salient variable to comment on her own social position and to display 
opposition to other social groups. Plainly, “hair” is a double referent to the long 
hair of a woman, capable of hiding things, but also, of course, to pubic hair, 
associated by proximity to the vagina. This image of hair is made even more 
crucial when one considers that, throughout anthropological history, much ado 
has been made about the significance of hair. Hair has been made to signify evil, 
and the absence of hair has been made to signify cleanliness, innocence, 
virginity. But the use Amos makes of hair in this verse is playful—mocking, 
even—of conventional, historistic attitudes against hair, quipping that “it wouldn’t 
be fair…if I ate her.” In other words, she plays against the fear of the “evil” hair, 
and uses it only to redouble a threat, as a metaphorical feint, and I argue, asking 
other women to laugh along with her. This is indexicality in Amos’ lyrics; she uses 
semiotic hitchhikers like “hair” to skillfully index a “feminine” identity, making 
stylistic moves to comment and refute traditional ideas about femininity itself. 
 In essence, then, “Cloud on My Tongue” is about the ugliness of the 
transition of the sexual development, and by metaphor, the signification or 
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actualization of a girl. It’s a fearsome, loathsome process. And yet, the speaker 
promises that the girl is destined to make the leap: “you’re already in there/I’ll be 
wearing your tattoo.” Therefore, despite the spinning in “circles and circles and 
circles again” as she attempts to gain her actualized body, she can be patient 
with the “ugliness” of the transition, until she finally makes it “over the bridge.” 
 
Stage Two: Sexual Rage and Irruption of the Chora 
Once a woman experiences shame and wounding at the hands of men, 
there is the inevitable rage, alongside a realization that she is viewed as 
property, more or less, according to the time, place, and cultural practices to 
which she finds herself subjected. This is stage two of the process of becoming 
an actualized woman. Here is a signification fraught with irony; she is capable of 
things a man cannot do, and yet, she is treated as chattel. She is enraged, and in 
a manner of speaking, she becomes insane.  
 Irigaray writes in “Women on the Market:”  
The society we know, our own culture, is based upon the exchange 
of women. Without the exchange of women, we are told, we would 
fall back into the anarchy (?) of the natural world, the randomness 
(?) of the animal kingdom. The passage into the social order, the 
symbolic order, into order as such, is assured by the fact that men, 
or groups of men, circulate women among themselves, according 
to a rule known as the incest taboo (170).   
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In “Professional Widow,” the speaker refers blatantly to the cycle of the incest 
taboo; the speaker confronts the phallic fear of the female sexual organ on one 
hand, simultaneously criticizing the idea that to have a big(ger) phallus is to be 
more of a man.  
slag pit 
stag shit 
honey bring it close to my lips 
yes 
don’t blow those brains yet 
we gotta be big boy 
we gotta be big 
Here, not only does the speaker imply that the hearer may be fearful of labia, but 
also, she implies that she is, in reality, only massaging the male ego with her 
mocking admiration of the phallus. This is a direct female appropriation of the 
phallic (Kristeva), and also a linguistic move which serves as what Eckert would 
term a gendered marker, repurposed to indicate an opposition to the social 
hierarchy (459) that values the phallus. Further, the speaker here criticizes 
marriage practices: 
starfucker just like my daddy 
just like my daddy selling his baby 
just like my daddy 
gonna strike a deal make him feel like a congressman 
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it runs in the family 
The speaker likens marriage to a prostitution3 of sorts; later she concludes the 
song with “she will supply.” In other words, the woman will supply her husband 
with sexual pleasure on demand.  
it runs in the family 
mother mary 
china white 
brown may be sweeter 
she will supply 
mother mary 
china white 
brown may be sweeter 
she will supply 
She seems to ask: Where are our principles, allowing this lawful sex trade to 
exist in civilized society? In short, marriage has been a “landslide of principle,” 
wherein everyone participates—“everywhere a Judas as far as you can see.”  
 In this coda we see also the irruption of the chora, wherein signs come to 
mean things they were not meant to signify. For example, “mother mary” seems 
here to mean something profane rather than sacred, and as “mother mary” is 
                                                          
3
 The speaker also refers to the religious symbolism associated with marriage, in which the bride is to be 
chaste virgin; however, a man may enter the marriage contract with sexual tastes and preferences: “mother 
mary/china white/brown may be sweeter.” Possibly in 1950’s American society more than any other in the 
world, a woman was, of course, expected to embody a “beautiful angel” with a persona all “peaches and 
cream,” urging her tired husband to “rest your shoulders” after a long day at work. Naturally, she might 
cater to his interests, proudly proclaiming “‘we got every re-run of Mohammed Ali.’” 
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juxtaposed with “china white” and “brown may be sweeter,” it seems to refer to 
skin, or to the sex organ itself. Whatever the interpretation, the impact is the 
same: women are available for men to choose--china white or brown, and 
innocent as “mother mary.” Thus, all three are highly sexualized, and what is 
theological by cultural standard—“mother mary”—is made to be an ordinary 
woman who is prostituted, cheapened. 
 This irruption of the chora which occurs here also figures as 
entextualization according to Mendoza-Denton (269-270); the image of mother 
Mary is a salient variable—it is salient culturally and religiously in the Western 
hemisphere—and here, it re-figures as an image of prostitution. Through 
intertextuality, this salient variable is reinterpreted. As Eckert explains, through a 
process of bricolage, “individual resources…can be interpreted and combined 
with other resources to construct a more complex meaningful entity” (457). In the 
case of the mother Mary variable, widely used in our society to indicate the 
religio-social entity of the virgin/bitch stereotype (e.g., obsession with the candy 
skull and Virgin de Guadalupe, pinups and geisha), takes on a new meaning. 
Mother Mary in the context of this song is used to lay bare the moral depravity 
behind the social practice of marriage, and even society’s treatment of women in 
general. The image of mother Mary as a supplier of sex is a grotesque caricature 
of the treatment of women, and in this light, it is much like that of “creak” when it 
is used to index a chola/o identity in the larger media. As Mendoza-Denton notes, 
“creak” takes on a certain racist connotation when used in the “how-to” manuals 
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she describes. “Professional Widow” is, indeed, strikingly similar in tone, if one 
considers it a sarcastic “how-to” manual for women.  
 In “Code Red,” the speaker comments on the illusive sexual agency of the 
feminine. Here, the speaker “Slip(s) and slide(s) (her) way through this charade” 
of being--or of feigning to be--the specular woman that society demands. But the 
speaker feels a certain victory over her slippery signification, as, she quips, “I 
know all the players and I must say/ Do this long enough/ you get a taste for it.” 
Ironically, though she is bitter about her plight as a woman in a man’s world, the 
speaker here does feel at ease in her finessing role: “Some say that I will and 
some say I won’t/ Victory is an elusive whore/ She is as easily mine/ as she is 
yours.” In other words, she seems to say: “Be careful--I might be getting good at 
this.” 
 Ultimately, however, the speaker in this song knows she needs to get out 
or to break out of her oppression, as evidenced in the chorus: “I’ll do this last one 
and I’ll grow me some wine/ Leave them troubled boys all behind/ What you 
stole, I would have given freely/ Code Red you’re staring Code Red staring at 
me.” She is determined and she is biding her time until she can leave; she knows 
she must leave before she dies/is suffocated/killed. She has had her fill of being 
the “sheath” and of being without agency, without will: “Well sometimes he do 
and sometimes he don’t/ Sometimes I love myself best alone/ Do this long 
enough/ you get a taste for it.” As Irigaray argues in “This Sex Which Is Not One”:  
Woman, in this sexual imaginary, is only a more or less obliging 
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prop for the enactment of man’s fantasies. That she may find 
pleasure there in that role, by proxy, is possible, even certain. But 
such pleasure is above all a masochistic prostitution of her body to 
a desire that is not her own, and it leaves her in a familiar state of 
dependency upon man. Not knowing what she wants, ready for 
anything, even asking for more, so long as he will “take” her as his 
“object” when he seeks his own pleasure. Thus she will not say 
what she herself wants; moreover, she does not know, or no longer 
knows, what she wants (25).  
In this passive state, the speaker of the song languishes close to despair, musing 
“being trusted and lusted/ it could be worse than that.” The speaker here has 
accepted a somewhat liminal signification; she is integral to the life of her man, 
but she is completely resigned to never being seen as herself. She simply 
threatens to disappear—to fall off the map—but she notably does not voice this 
plan to her husband. She lives her life as a “second-class citizen.” She signifies 
only halfway because her job is simply to be content with her life as it is; 
stunningly, this sort of half-life is still experienced by women who consider 
themselves “modern women” in today’s society.  
 Thus, the fate of the woman in the second stage is to always already be at 
the beck and call of her male counterpart, and to secretly yearn for a life outside 
the bounds of her liminal life. She is living in a stagnant state. She may even 
have all the modern conveniences, like the woman of the fifties who got bored 
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with her life of martinis at five o’clock and a roast for dinner, reading The 
Feminine Mystique only to find what she knew instinctively—that her life of 
washing machines and perfectly-placed vinyl furniture was a newly-fangled 
prison.  
 Susan Faludi’s Backlash speaks in a timely manner on this struggle: are 
women to feel they “have it all” when they choose to work outside the home, or 
are they to feel they have abandoned their original calling as wives and mothers? 
Are we more accepting of women of all body types now than we were in the 
50’s? Do we regard gay and straight women as equally feminine? Or, would it be 
that to be a “real” woman is to leave “femininity,” as a construct, behind? 
Ironically, the past fifty years have not made this question simpler to answer. The 
conventional wisdom of the current age seems to be simply that there is no 
conventional wisdom. What is the answer to being fulfilled as a woman? There is 
no one choice that yields a satisfying result for the women of our age.  
 
Stage Three: Change/Jouissance 
 And yet, there seem to be some moments of actualization. We all know 
women who are happy, who have achieved balance. Might there be, however, a 
better chance for more women to feel as if the choices we have made are 
acceptable? I argue here that the necessary ingredient to a healthy definition of 
“femininity” is to make a certain theoretical leap. By accepting the theories of 
Butler in conjunction with Kristeva and other linguistic theorists, we might arrive 
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at a certain jouissance, shall we say, which may allow for our linguistic theories, 
backed by the “‘age-old’ culture of the signifier” (Barthes 6) and all it implies, to 
be challenged and even changed.  
 “Velvet Revolution” provides a view of a sexual revolution in which the 
body of the woman becomes actualized. First, the speaker makes reference to 
history and social position, through the metaphor of fabric: “Feeling radical in 
Cotton/ Purified in my Satin/ But the bomb of the season/ is a Velvet Revolution.” 
The cotton is the radical movement, possibly the women’s movement and also 
associated with religious fanaticism. Next, she refers to satin, which the fabric of 
evening gowns and wedding dresses. And finally, she says, it’s time to break out 
the velvet--clearly the fabric of the harlot. Or, in this case, the plush fabric with all 
the richness of the female sex organ. Tellingly, she says the “bomb,” which may 
be read as the “balm” of the season, is velvet. In other words, it’s the answer. 
Even as “prophets (cry),” the speaker says she looks to the “true Divine Creator” 
for assistance.  
I look at the sky 
and feel the tears of the 
Prophets crying 
I look at the sky 
and feel the rain 
the rain of tears   (Amos, “Velvet Revolution”) 
The speaker here is answered by the “rain”—or is it the “reign”?—of tears. I 
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argue that the speaker refers here to the reign of man over woman, the reign of 
phallogocentrism and the fear of women. Besides, she asserts, men have not 
done such a wonderful job at ruling the planet; in other words, maybe it’s time to 
give the women a shot at it.: “All you killers of the children/ there’s a new 
Commandment/ the true Divine Creator wants a/ Velvet Revolution.”4 Who is this 
“true” Divine Creator? I argue that Amos actually refers to a new way of figuring 
the Judeo-Christian God. She asserts that the “true” God has not sanctioned the 
actions taken by men in their possession or exchange of women.  
 In “Body and Soul,” the speaker invites the listener, or the audience, to 
commune with her, to “come and live with (her)/ body and soul.” This “sweet 
communion,” although it may read simply as a sexual invitation, is made spiritual 
and metaphysical, even rhetorical, as she urges “lay your law down on me love.” 
In other words, Aristotelian logic may not hold here, the chora may be disrupted 
and cause a “fissure” of phallogocentric logic, but it may instead be that the law 
must seek another (more feminine, not male) body upon which to base itself. 
Thusly, she asks the male hierarchy to literally lay its law down on her, the chora, 
which may cause an irruption. The reference is made again to Judeo-Christian 
religion: “Seven devils bring them on/ I have left my weapons/ Cause I think 
you’re wrong/ These devils of yours they need love” (Amos, “Body and Soul”). In 
other words, sin, which, according to the Bible, originated with women because 
of Eve’s indiscretion with the snake in the Garden of Eden, must be reevaluated 
                                                          
4
 Would this Divine Creator be a female? A mixture of both female and male?  
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because women are no more evil than men, who have sinned against women 
throughout history. These lyrics are, I argue, an almost literal plea for the 
irruption for which the speaker refers. If the irruption she speaks of were to occur, 
the “devils” she refers to might be reevaluated in terms of their capacity for good, 
simply because women, who have been blamed for original sin, might not be as 
evil as Judeo-Christian religion portrays. 
 Finally, in “Dragon,” Amos’ speaker charges that it is a lie that this same 
sin--original sin--began with women: “Don’t tell me/ A woman did this to you/ 
Candy lies/ Candy lies/ Candy lies.” The speaker here argues against the 
traditional either/or thinking of Aristotle and of the Bible: “You touched my hand/ I 
felt a force/ You called it dark/ but now I’m not so sure/ Just stay awhile…” She 
argues that the forces of darkness identified by Judeo-Christian religion may not, 
indeed, be evil. Next, the speaker uses the imagery of fairy tales to solidify the 
notion that our belief-system and our logic needs to be broken, by referring to the 
dragon as not an evil thing that “needs slaying,” but instead a beast to whom she 
will bring kisses. Thus, just as in “Body and Soul,” “Dragon” refutes either/or 
thinking for the perspective of both/and inclusiveness. 
 Clearly the speaker places Judeo-Christian religion at the heart of the 
oppression of women throughout history, as well.  
When I look back over 
documents and pages 
Ancient savageries 
57 
Christened those inflated. 
Now it has come to light 
the Gods they have slipped up 
They forgot about the power 
of a woman’s love 
In other words, claims the speaker here, a complete and total reevaluation of the 
impetus for our moral base must be conducted if we are to truly eradicate the 
roots of misogyny from our culture and language.  
The refrain contains an example of semiotic hitchhiking, as the “Dragon’s” 
speaker tells the audience: “Your dragon needs slaying.” In this case the dragon 
represents the prejudice of the male hierarchy against women, which, once slain, 
can eradicate prejudiced practices from Judeo-Christian culture. In this case, the 
audience being addressed appears to be male, and the terms used to describe 
the hierarchy clearly oppose it. Thus, “dragon” appears as a salient variable for 
the entextualization of a “feminine” marked stance.  
 So what? What if the signification process undergoes revision? One might 
argue that we have already done this important work if, as Kristeva might say, we 
have allowed such language as that in Amos’ lyrics to signify at all in our culture. 
One might say we have already shot our language through with its own posited 
condition and analyzed the roots of its logic—and even displaced its logic—if we 
have understood what Amos “means” in her lyrics. Or one might argue that this 
work might not really change our language or the way women figure in our 
58 
society. What difference does it really make to our lives? How does this awkward 
transition in thought signify in our language, if at all?  
 Indeed, there are certain theoretical leaps which must be attended to if we 
accept the message in Amos’ lyrics along with their precarious reference to 
Butler’s body theory and the linguistic theories of Kristeva, Tannen, and Eckert. 
Namely, an acceptance of these theories would entail a rejection of either/or 
thinking for both/and thinking—a rejection of the logic of Aristotle and Plato, 
which, not without reason, is that of the Judeo-Christian logic very oppressive to 
women. This revision of our logic would entail a reevaluation of our morals and 
belief systems. And finally, because this reevaluation of these structures might 
lead—backwards—into a reevaluation of linguistics and theology, we might even 
reevaluate our ideas of how we as a species came to signify at all. We may 
revision the concept of deity.   
 I have argued that connections exist between French feminism on one 
hand, and body theory, third-wave feminism, and linguistic theory based in 
intertextuality on the other. The nexus for these theories are the stylistic moves 
noted by Eckert and Mendoza-Denton in the creation and maintenance and 
reinterpretation of identity (Eckert 456; Mendoza-Denton 270). If identity exists as 
a collocation of meanings called a “style,” then a “feminine” style might exist 
which can be quantified not in essentialist terms.  
But not only does this mean that the theorists can bury their hatchets; it 
means also that a revision of what it is to be a woman must be accomplished. 
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This is the why of Amos’ lyrics; she approaches these questions of the elusive 
“feminine” and of the male hierarchy by making just the stylistic moves necessary 
to locate the feminine in a space of inclusion and of a certain freedom from the 
Judeo-Christian bounds which have made the very of a “feminine” style 
distasteful to both men and women alike, for so long. 
In my final chapter, I will clarify the implications of jouissance or “revolution 
in poetic language” according to Kristeva, and correlate this phenomenon with 
Mendoza-Denton’s concept of semiotic hitchhiking, to show that a “feminine” 
style rooted in intertextuality might mean certain changes in our way of thinking 
about the functionality of the body and its relationship to language, about our 
ideas of the body and its relationship to society, and ultimately, about what/who 
God might be. Specifically, I will show Kristeva’s notion of the theologization of 
the thetic as it pertains to our perception of God, and how this perception has 
affected the relationship of the body to language and to our ideas of who should 
be doing what work and holding what status in our society, showing that once 
Kristeva’s notion of jouissance—alongside Mendoza-Denton’s idea of semiotic 
hitchhiking—is employed, these structures crumble, and “lay bare” (Kristeva 78-
79) the true, historistic relationship between language, functionality, and deity. 
Lastly, I will propose a revision of our practices with regard to the functionality of 
the body and how it is embodied, or entextualized, through language, to show 
that a revision of deity, through language, can mean a certain revision of what we 
term as “feminine.”   
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CHAPTER THREE 
BUTLER, THE SACRED AND THE DISIDENTIFICATION  
OF NAMING 
 
 
I have argued that certain “stylistic moves” (Eckert 458), as explained in 
the first chapter, can be styled as “feminine” within localized discourses, and that 
these same moves can be utilized as “rallying points for a liberatory contestation” 
(qtd. in Sullivan 82) of what “feminine” is and means. In Amos’ lyrics, we can see 
such counterhegemonic references to the Bible, sex, marriage, sexuality, gender, 
and womanhood. As explained in chapter one, Ochs’ and others view language 
as a mode of positioning the self, through “stances” and other “social acts” (337). 
According to Ochs, any speech act betrays information about the speaker, 
through what Ochs call the linguistic phenomenon of indexicality, whereby a 
persona is developed (340). Thus, we might say that Amos’ lyrics provide an 
example of localized “social acts” and “stances” that index certain forms of 
“femininity.” Further, as Eckert notes, certain “salient” variables might operate 
within a “field of potential meanings—an indexical field, or constellation of 
ideologically related meanings” (454). This process, called enregistration, links 
local linguistic practices/forms with practices in the larger “political economy” 
(Eckert 456). As noted in chapter two, Amos refers to certain “social acts,” such 
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as “crawling” and “on my knees” (“Girl”), which have a particular context within 
the socio-sexual historicity of woman. Further, in “Cloud on My Tongue,” Amos 
refers to the salient variable “hair” as she positions herself in the kitchen, a 
“stance” that indexes womanhood, thus “creat(ing) a linguistic landscape through 
the segmentation of the practices within (her social) terrain” (455). By repeatedly 
indexing and segmenting the social terrain of womanhood, Amos illustrates 
Mendoza-Denton’s concept of intertextuality, called “entextualization” (269), 
which occurs when salient variables come to stand for concepts for which they 
were not originally intended, as explicated in chapter one (Amos’ use of Virgin 
Mary as a prostitute to comment on the social conditions for women). 
Finally, I have shown that Amos’ language usage falls uniquely into that 
milieu which Kristeva and other French feminists might term a “feminine” 
language or discourse, and that with a thorough examination of Amos’ lyrics, we 
might discover an encouraging message about the “feminine” body come to 
matter, as Butler suggests. The connection here—between the linguists on one 
hand the French feminists on the other—is intertextuality, as explained in the 
previous two chapters. When Kristeva says “irruption of the chora,” Mendoza-
Denton says “entextualization.” Mendoza-Denton describes entextualization as 
recontextualization of a variable in a context other than originally intended (269), 
whereas Kristeva describes the irruption of the chora as an event in which 
“[l]anguage thus tends to be drawn out of its symbolic function (sign-syntax) and 
is opened out within a semiotic function” (63). In effect, then, Amos’ use of salient 
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variables is one example of the entextualization of those variables, wherein the 
social constructs behind variables like “hair” and “Virgin Mary,” just to name two, 
are laid bare. In this way, Amos’ use of these salient variables is a sociopolitical 
act of resistance to hegemonic femininity and an encouragement to women and 
to all people yearning for ways to come to matter. This final chapter will elucidate 
this affirmation and its implications for our logical systems.  
 
Foreground 
I have shown how a revision of French feminist theory, seen through the 
lens of current body and linguistic theory, might be used to obtain a relevant 
understanding of “feminine” identity and style construction from a theoretical 
standpoint. Third-wave feminism has come away from the essentialist argument, 
quoted at length in chapter one, that woman “is indefinitely other than herself” 
(Irigaray 29) and that any truly “feminine” language would be part of a 
“nonthematizable” outside (to which anything feminine would be relegated by to 
the stricture of the patronymic order of language and signification). Third wave 
feminists and body theorists have arrived at a more measured approach to 
gender; specifically, Butler discusses the concept of the “specular woman”—that 
which society expects and reiterates—and refutes this identity. Butler argues that 
a lessened form of identity has been foisted on women: women are (improper) 
copies of a male original. But using Aristetelian logic against Aristotle’s 
syllogisms, she presents an alternative to the idea that women are bad copies. 
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Instead, she asserts that “woman” is the original, and that through performativity, 
women enact our gender by compulsively mimicking the “specular” (43-45).  
As noted in chapter two, Barthes asserts, as “language is 
redistributed…two edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing 
edge…and another edge, mobile, blank, (ready to assume any contours)” (6-7). 
Using Becker’s theory that “the actual a-priori of any language event…in an 
accumulation of remembered prior texts” (qtd. in Tannen 37), Butler asserts that 
gender (i.e., any identity) is an “accumulation of remembered texts,” and if our 
positions and even our salient variables are “remembered,” then these “edges” to 
which Barthes alludes are political. In other words, moments of “pleasure” in the 
text in poetic language have a transformative power. The power of the seeming 
il-logic of Amos lyrics could change our worldview. Indeed, there are real-world 
implications for the use of these theories in our daily lives, language, and 
language practices.  
Acceptance of these theories entails a rejection of our rhetorical system of 
beliefs and discursive practices, as an outgrowth of rejection of the Judeo-
Christian oppression of women using religious texts, which have been translated 
from Hebrew or Greek, using Aristotelian logic as their basis----which means that 
we have to reevaluate our morals and belief systems using a more inclusive 
logic. Women, once thought weak, could be strong. Women, once thought to be 
bad copies of men, are “original.” Women, once thought illogical, could be logical. 
Women, once trying to be more like men to prove their worth, could be in their 
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natural bodies, could be valued for their womanliness without any of the 
pandering and patronizing.  
What would this new logic entail? Tori Amos clearly believes that we 
should look at our God again--could He be a She? Could He be a non-gendered 
or dual-gendered being? What does this imply for the way that Butler has proved 
that our logic bases itself upon the male body as the site of actuality? If a 
woman’s body is the site of actuality, how might this change our perceptions of 
reality/truth/logic? A detailed analysis of Amos’ lyrics shows us how the woman’s 
body as the site of actuality in language might work, and how it might revision our 
phallogocentric logic. 
 
Butler and the “Tacit Cruelties” of the Bound Thetic  
Much of our current rhetorical systems and laws are based on Aristotelian 
syllogisms regarding classification and naming. Through naming and 
categorizing, women have been kept “in their place” for thousands of years. 
Because Butler offers some very practical interpretation of our current system’s 
reliance upon Aristotelian rhetorical hierarchies, and some stunningly simple and 
practical advice for a revision of our cultural belief systems, Butler’s theories will 
serve here as the mainstay of my resolution to the problem of the “feminine” and 
its figuring in our (Western, Judeo-Christian) culture. 
 Butler bases her theories of gender identity and the “feminine” on the 
French feminist theories of Kristeva and Irigaray. As noted in the first chapter, 
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Kristeva asserts that poetic language has the potential to displace or “breach” the 
thetic, or posited subject, through mimetic language (57), or language that makes 
use of the symbolic order. Butler is careful to explain that the “symbolic order,” or 
the societally accepted chain of signification, is upheld by proper use and transfer 
of ideas and categories from one person to the next, or from generation to 
generation.    
Butler refers to the symbolic order as a set of “socially contingent rules of 
subject-formation,” separate from, but working implicitly with a “set of ‘laws’ or 
‘structures’ that constitute the invariant mechanisms of foreclosure through which 
any subject comes into being” (190). This law produces what Butler calls 
“normativize(d) sexed positionalities,” or genders, and in doing so, “engages the 
traumatic production of a sexual antagonism in its symbolic normativity… 
rendering culturally abject…(those) cultural organizations of sexuality that exceed 
the structuring purview of that law” (190-191). In other words, the construction of 
gender is rife with “tacit cruelties” (115) which mean the figurative or cultural 
death to those who signify uneasily within the symbolic order. Furthermore, 
Butler notes, “the risk, of course, is that contingent regulatory mechanisms of 
subject-production may be reified as universal laws, exempted from the very 
process of discursive rearticulation that they occasion” (191). The danger is that 
a society has no frame with which to evaluate its own laws of signification; hence, 
these “tacit(ly) (cruel)” laws are simply reiterated, handed down from 
automatically from our forefathers.  
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The idea that discursive practice might be exempt from critique is not new; 
Kristeva, too, notes this cultural exemption in her notion of sacrifice and the 
theologization of the thetic:  
The sacred—sacrifice—which is found in every society, is, a 
theologization of the thetic, itself structurally indispensible to the 
positing of language. This theologization takes on different forms 
depending on the degree of development of the society’s 
productive forces. It represents either the signifying process’ 
dependence on natural forces and the surrounding ecological 
system, or its subordination to the social relations between subjects 
caught in kinship relations (78).  
Kristeva refers here to discursive patterns such as the functionality of the body 
and its relationship to language in our society. The thetic is bound through 
sacrifice—through what Kristeva calls the “positing of violence” or the “bound(ing) 
of the thetic” (78)—to constrain discursive practices, including those that 
represent gender. Just as Butler notes, these discursive practices and the laws 
that order them are not examined; rather, they are simply reiterated, and what is 
more, they are viewed as somehow “sacred.” Yet, Butler, like Amos, I would 
argue, agrees the time has come to question this tacit ostracism from the male 
chain of signification.  
Particularly, in Amos’ “Pancake,” the speaker refers very plainly to the 
sacred enacted by Judeo-Christian religion, in which she places strategic 
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references to the discursive power of the notion of sacrifice: “Seems like you and 
your tribe/ decided you’d rewrite the law/ segregate the mind/ from Body from 
Soul.” Here, the speaker blatantly refers to the dissection of the maternal body 
from iteration, and calls for “A change of course in/ our direction/ a dash of truth/ 
spread thinly” in the face of Christianity’s misogyny and homophobia. Finally, the 
speaker in “Pancake” seems to refer to the force of iteration that women have 
experienced through exclusion from the divine will: 
Oh Zion please 
remove your glove 
and dispel every 
trace 
Of His spoken word 
That has lodged 
In my vortex 
Here, the speaker asks for Christianity to leave her consciousness. Finally, the 
speaker indicts the male world and God for this exclusion: “You could have 
spared/ her — oh but no/ Messiahs need/ people dying in their name.” Here, in a 
sense, the speaker indicts God for using a male figure rather than a female one 
for the sacrifice, and for allowing the implications of the Messiah’s gender to be 
conflated by the patriarchy throughout history. “Why a male? Why allow this?” 
she seems to ask. Because the naming of the Messiah is a patriarchal sacrifice, 
which correlates to Kristeva’s notion of the sacrifice, we have been constantly 
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aware of the male examples of such a sacrifice (epic heroes are almost always 
male, and when thinking of heroes, we tend to think only of male firefighters, 
male police officers, and male soldiers as committing sacrificial deeds), while 
being inept to the force of iteration of female sacrifice, which has been enacted 
for years, without being recognized as such (Mary, virgin sacrifice). Thus, any 
mimesis of this sacrifice which is effected by women is not read as sacrifice; it is 
something else, something Other. Thus, we cannot “thematize” the tears of the 
Virgin of Guadalupe or of the candy skull. We reproduce them compulsively in 
pop culture, hoping that they will reveal themselves to our consciousness, but 
because they do not represent a male sacrifice, we cannot fathom the sadness of 
the Virgin. Why, pretty girl? What sadness? What speaking (“feminine”) subject? 
It is this theoretical leap, from the vision of the Divine—and by extension, the 
Divine sacrifice—as male, to the vision of the Divine and the Divine sacrifice as 
female/Other, which Amos’ lyrics utter into existence.   
 
The Sacred Act of Naming 
As Butler writes, one cannot deny the violence inherent in the act of 
naming. By naming and constraining gender, discursive practice enacts a “‘chain’ 
of iteration” that cannot be divorced from historicity (Butler 187). Thus, gender is 
not “performative” in the sense that the subject chooses to enact its gender; 
rather, gender is constrained by a set of discursive practices that allow or 
disallow a particular body to be intelligible, conceivable, or uttered at all (187). In 
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other words, gender performativity, or any performativity, is a “forced reiteration 
of norms” (94). What this means is that any identity definition is conditioned by its 
“outside.” The violence inherent in naming is, then, the erasure, or cultural death, 
of any phenomenon that occurs outside the norm. This violence is a cultural 
refusal to recognize, or, to quote Kristeva, to “thematize” that which exists 
outside the norm—in effect, to deny the existence of the referent altogether. 
Yet, as Butler writes, “the constitutive outside means that identity always 
requires precisely that which it cannot abide” (188). To create a coherent 
gendered image of what is “woman,” there must be an image of what is not. Any 
identity formation includes what Butler calls “the abasement through which 
coherence is fictively produced and sustained” (115). Butler continues,  
Something on this order is at work most obviously in the production 
of coherent heterosexuality, but also in the production of coherent 
lesbian identity, coherent gay identity, and within those worlds, the 
coherent butch, the coherent femme. In each of these cases, if 
identity is constructed through opposition, it is also constructed 
through rejection. It may be that if a lesbian opposes 
heterosexuality absolutely, she may find herself more in its power 
that a straight or bisexual woman who knows or lives its constitutive 
instability. And if a butchness requires a strict opposition to 
femmeness, is this a refusal of an identification or is this an 
identification with femmeness that has already been made, made 
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and disavowed, a disavowed identification that sustains the butch, 
without which the butch qua butch cannot exist? (115).  
In other words, simply to negate the existence of opposing subject-positions 
might not be enough to explain or to guarantee the status of a referent; indeed, at 
some times, the denial of the opposition does as much damage to one ideology 
as it does to its opposing ideology. I quote this passage at length because it 
illustrates the central point I am trying to make about how our logic at this 
moment in history relies on either/or thinking. There is, in our way of thinking, as 
Butler states, “either ‘A’ or ‘not A’” (35-37); nevertheless, one can see the 
problems with this logic.   
What Butler recommends is not a simple rejection of Aristotelian (either/or) 
logic and its replacement with both/and logic, however. What Butler advocates is 
rather a reworking of our system of “repudiation… subordination…or exploitative 
relation” (118). Sometimes, in this new system of logic, “A” might mean the 
existence of a “not A,” but in others, “A” might entail a “sometimes A.”      
Butler refers to the term “women” as a “political signifier,” and notes that 
No signifier can be radically representative, for every signifier is the 
site of a perpetual méconnaissance, it produces the expectation of 
a unity, a full and final recognition that can never be achieved. 
Paradoxically, the failure of such signifiers—“women” is the one 
that comes to mind—fully to describe the constituency they name is 
precisely what constitutes these signifiers as sites of phantasmatic 
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investment and discursive rearticulation. It is what opens the 
signifier to new meanings and new possibilities for political 
resignification. It is this open-ended and performative function of 
the signifier that seems to me to be crucial to a radical democratic 
notion of futurity (191).  
In other words, the only way to avoid a “paralysis” in terms of signification with 
regard to identity politics is to take into account not only the historicity of a word, 
but also its possibilities, its future (193). Butler argues that conceiving of identity 
as a uniform entity treats it as an end, when it should instead be the means to a 
greater end. Instead, identity, she argues, should be a jumping-off point for a 
reexamination of our discursive practices.  
 Butler advocates an “anti-descriptivist view of naming” which might see 
the name as possibly “designat(ing) a contingent and open organizing principle 
for the formation of political groups,” thus “provid(ing) a linguistic theory for an 
anti-essentialist identity politics” (208). From this perspective, one must admit 
that any attempt to unify a multiply-constituted referent through a signifier is 
“phantasmatic” and, thus, functions as a “disidentification.” In this case, Butler 
argues, “politics holds out the promise of the manageability of unspeakable loss” 
(209), to perform rather than to represent identity or any ideological formation 
(210).  
 In the view of Jacques Lacan, “‘(t)he essentially performative character of 
naming is the precondition for all hegemony and politics’” (qtd. in Butler 211). 
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Yet, Butler notes, it is this moment in signification that gives way to what she 
calls a “radical democratic politics” (210) because, “if the process of naming 
objects amounts to the very act of their formation, then their descriptive features 
will be fundamentally unstable and open to all kinds of hegemonic rearticulations” 
(210). Butler observes: “It is of no small significance that proper names are 
derived from the paternal dispensation of its own name, and that the performative 
power of the paternal signifier to ‘name’ is derived from the function of the 
patronym” (211). Indeed, the act of naming is, according to Saul Kripke, a 
discursive practice—the “fixing of the referent”—which can be traced back to the 
Bible, to the original naming that God performed on Adam (qtd. in Butler 212). In 
this way, naming is a citational practice, “a reiteration of the divine process of 
naming, whereby naming the son inaugurates his existence within the divinely 
sanctioned community of man” (212).  
 The implications of this view of naming are crucial to our understanding of 
“women” as a multiple referent; if “women” is something “outside” which cannot 
be named, and whose constituents receive no named continuation of the 
patriarchal line, then “women” are seen, even linguistically, as existing outside 
the divine community of man sanctioned by God. Women not sanctioned by 
God?  
 According to Kripke, language users are bound by a “chain of normative 
usage,” indicating, through naming, a “causal link” which normativizes their 
“intention” (qtd. in Butler 213). In this process, Kripke specifically names the act 
73 
of baptism as a discursive practice to mark the naming of a subject (qtd. in Butler 
214). In this way, the act of naming secures a place for the referent within the 
divine will of God; Butler comments that  
It appears to follow, then, that the fixing of the referent is the 
forcible production of that fictive homogeneity, and, indeed, of that 
community: the agreement by which the referent becomes fixed (an 
agreement which is a continual agreeing again that happens over 
time) is itself reproduced on the condition that the reference is fixed 
in some way…it is the reiteration of the divine performative and, 
perhaps also, the extension of the divine will in its uniformity, then it 
is God the father who patronymically extends his putative kingdom 
through the recursive fixing of the referent (qtd. in Butler 214).  
Thus, naming of people and objects, such as baptism or even conferring upon a 
multiply-constituted group a particular name (such as that of “women”), is an act 
which reiterates the notion of what God thematizes. Thus, naming functions as a 
theologization of the thetic.  
 Amos refers to this theologization of the thetic in “Muhammed, My Friend,” 
wherein the speaker suggests that the Messiah was actually a woman: 
Muhammad my friend 
it’s time to tell the world 
we both know it was a girl back in Bethlehem 
and on that fateful day 
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when she was crucified 
she wore Shiseido red and we drank tea 
by her side 
Here, the speaker refutes the idea of male sacrifice and the male sacred order. In 
a patriarchal society, there must a patrilinear blood-line, in which there must be a 
sacred son, not a sacred daughter.  
As Butler notes, the sacred order is promoted and continued through “rigid 
designation,” combined with “patronymic production and transmission of a 
uniformity of intention.” In this way, it is possible to “secure the lines of this 
transmission through time through the production of stable kinship, that is, strict 
lines of patrilineality…and through the exclusion of catachresis” (215). What is 
significant to my thesis in this remark is that all these totems, so to speak, must 
be in place to achieve the continuation of patrilineality, but alongside the 
exclusion of catachresis: the very phenomenon which makes jouissance possible 
in language must be excluded in order to exert the theologization of the thetic.  
 
The Performative Power of the Name 
 According to Butler, the “performative power of the name…cannot be 
isolated from the paternal economy within which it operates, and the power-
differential between the sexes that institutes and serves” (216). But using 
Kripke’s notion that “‘the referent’ depends essentially on those catachrestic acts 
of speech that either fail to refer or refer in the wrong way” (Butler 217), Butler 
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argues that this im-proper naming of things can open possibilities for new 
meanings (218). Butler indirectly deals with the question of what happens when a 
woman, member of the catachrestically identified group “women,” speaks: she 
argues that the term “women” as an identifier “will gain and lose its stability to the 
extent that it remains differentiated and that differentiation serves political goals” 
(218). But Butler resists the temptation to categorize “women” as the lost 
referent. Instead she argues that “(t)o call into question women as the privileged 
figure of ‘the lost referent,’ however, is precisely to recast that description as a 
possible signification, and to open the term as site for a more expansive 
rearticulation” (218).    
 But the danger is that danger which is so easily gleaned from reading 
Irigaray’s description of “women,” quoted at length in chapter one, which poses 
that a woman is “always something other than herself.” Butler argues that “if 
women are positioned as that which cannot exist, as that which is barred from 
existence by the law of the father, then there is a conflation of women with that 
foreclosed existence, that lost referent, which is surely as pernicious as any form 
of ontological essentialism” (219). Butler argues that the answer is to “make the 
signifier into a site for a set of rearticulations that cannot be predicted or 
controlled, and to provide for a future in which constituencies will form that have 
not yet had a site for such an articulation or which ‘are’ not prior to the siting of 
such a site” (219).   
 Amos herself refers to the patronymy of naming. In “Crazy,” the speaker 
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refers to the fall of Eve, which places her, and all women, in the subjective 
position. 
Not sayin’ 
Not charmed at all 
Not sayin’ 
that you weren’t worth 
the fall 
Next, the speaker refers to the “real” that Butler also notes, from Foucault and 
Žižek:  
So I let Crazy 
take a spin 
Then I let Crazy 
settle in 
Kicked off my shoes 
Shut reason out 
He said ‘’first let’s just 
unzip your religion 
down’  
The speaker lets herself be subsumed under the term “women” by patronymic 
naming and ideas of the specular woman. But, she resists this naming, naming 
resistance “crazy.” In other words, any rejection of patronymic naming is seen as 
insanity, because it is outside the thematizable. The speaker’s identity—
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“women”—constitutes what Žižek terms the “real” (207), what is unsanctioned by 
the patronymic and, by proxy, divine, discursive practice of naming. In order to 
reject it, she must “unzip (her) religion,” which has placed her logistically, and, 
therefore, theologically, outside divine will.    
Finally, the speaker refers to naming: 
Found that I 
I craved at all 
Saw me melt 
into your 
native shelter 
Where you carved my 
name 
Paper tigers scare 
and came  
Alive 
When the speaker comes to “crave,” or speak, at all, she speaks as a “lost 
referent” who must “melt into (her) native shelter,” womanhood—a seemingly 
subconscious, a-priori linguistic and discursive practice of occupying a certain 
thematizable sexed, sociopolitical position in society—in order to signify. 
Signifying as a woman is a somehow half-signification.   
 Further, “paper tigers scare,” meaning something that seems so harmless, 
like a name, can be threatening. And yet, she notes these paper tigers  
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came alive 
through the dawn 
through the light 
through the time 
when you said 
you could 
drive all night 
In other words, the name of “women” must be reopened, as Butler argues, to 
new signification: 
Heard that you were once 
‘Temptation’s Girl’   
And as soon 
as you have 
rearranged the mess 
in your head 
He will show up looking 
sane 
perfectly sane 
If I know Crazy 
In other words, “women,” having born the signification of original sin, can reopen 
the term “women,” reifying the term, giving the term a futurity that contradicts its 
historicity—a notion which, in itself, demonstrates the new logic entailed by an 
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acceptance of the theories I orchestrate in this thesis. Amos argues that if we 
“rearrange the (logical) mess in (our) head(s),” “Crazy,” the named 
personification of the “real”—what is currently seen as insanity because it is 
outside the thematizable—will look “perfectly sane.”  
In fact, an improvisation Amos performed on Radio Uno Italy on October 
16, 2002, further emphasizes the theme of naming found in these lyrics:  
tell me 
do you see 
the same face 
when I say the name 
crazy 
tell me 
do you see 
the same face 
when I say his name 
Here the speaker reiterates the (patronymic) discursive practice of naming in 
order to subvert its patronymic claim over her identity. She effectively pokes 
holes in the process of naming and all of its innate structures and consequences. 
 Butler argues that “failure of identification is the point of departure for a 
more democratizing affirmation of internal difference” (219). By asking what the 
audience sees when she says “his name,” the speaker alludes to the very 
disidentification to which Butler continually refers. If “Crazy” is the resistance to 
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the thematizable, then to understand “crazy” is to understand the “real,” the 
constitutive outside. Indeed, she argues that “through a certain insistent citing of 
the signifier…a repetition compulsion at the level of signification…an iterable 
practice that shows that what one takes to be a political signifier is itself the 
sedimentation of prior signifiers…” (219-220).  
  Amos refers very plainly, it seems, to a reopening of signification in “Iiiii.” 
First the speaker starts with wordplay, an element of jouissance, “With your E's/ 
And your ease/ And I do one more,” referring next to the patronymy and its hold 
on language: 
Need a lip gloss boost 
In your America 
Is it God's 
Is it yours 
Sweet saliva 
Here, the speaker asks for an end to patronymic traditions in language and 
signification, quipping that our discursive practices here in America need a “lip 
gloss boost,” possibly even referring to an “instinctual glossolalia” much like what 
Irigaray describes as a more woman-centered language. Next, she calls the 
theologization of the thetic to task by asking if “saliva” belongs to God. Has God 
ordained the naming of saliva, as such?  
 Next, the speaker refers to Kristeva’s notion of linguistic sacrifice, and the 
effect of cultural abjection:  
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I know we're dying 
And there's no sign of a parachute 
We scream in cathedrals 
Why can't it be beautiful 
Why does there 
Gotta be a sacrifice 
Here the speaker asks why patronymic signification must result in exclusion. 
Jouissance is in effect here, indicated by wordplay and inclusion rather an 
exclusion. Further, the speaker refers to patronymic threat of hellfire, the ultimate 
expression of the constitutive outside which, in this thesis, signifies a place 
outside the divine plan, as she asks God to “Just say yes/ You little arsonist/ 
You're so sure you can save/ Every hair on my chest.”  
Next, Amos seems to encourage a rejection of our rhetorical system of 
beliefs and discursive practices and a rejection of the Judeo-Christian oppression 
of women through religious doctrine and theologized discursive practices. In 
“Virginia,” Amos refers to a woman, Virginia (a personification of the state of 
Virginia):  
she may betray 
all that she loves 
and even wait 
for their 
Savior 
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to come 
Here the woman, Virginia, “can’t remember (her) name” after she has given up all 
that she loves, waiting “for their Savior to come.” Amos seems to argue that the 
time to change our signification of women is urgently approaching, as  
(Virginia) loses 
a little each 
day 
to ghetto pimps 
and presidents 
who try and 
arouse 
her turquoise 
serpents 
She can’t recall 
what they represent 
and when you 
ask, she won’t know  
Here, although Virginia has not completely been broken down (or taken over) by 
the patrilinear logic—“she can’t recall/ what they represent”—she “loses a little 
each day.” And yet, she “lay(s) down her Body/ covering him all the same.” This 
reference to “covering” bears eerie resemblance to Butler’s discussion of the 
catachresis inherent in the naming of a multiply constituted category such as 
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“women.”  
 
Agency and Performative Power 
 Butler argues that “to take up the political signifier (which is always a 
matter of taking up a signifier by which one is oneself already taken up, 
constituted, initiated) is to be taken into a chain of prior usages, to be installed in 
the midst of significations that cannot be situated in terms of clear origins or 
ultimate goals” (219). As clarified in chapter one, because of this instability, 
Butler argues that agency can never be understood as a controlling authorship 
over that signifying chain, and it cannot be the power, once installed and 
constituted in and by that chain, to set a sure course for its future;” rather, agency 
in this light is what Butler describes as a  
‘chain’ of signification (which) operates through a certain insistent 
citing of the signifier, an iterable practice whereby the political 
signifier is perpetually resignified, a repetition compulsion at the 
level of signification…(wherein) what one takes to be a political 
signifier is itself the sedimentation of prior signifiers, the effect of 
their reworking (220).  
Butler asserts that to use a term such as “women” or “queer” is to “install a (false) 
identity through repetition,” a term which acts as a “disloyalty against identity—a 
catachresis…a disloyalty that works the iterability of the signifier for what remains 
non-self-identical in any invocation of identity, namely, the iterable or temporal 
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conditions of its own possibility” (220).  
 This concept of a “disloyal” signifier is what is being employed when 
Virginia covers “him.” Although she knows she is not being fairly described, she 
uses her Body (with a capital “B”—to indicate that the female body is being 
reopened to divine will?) to smooth over the rough spots in signification, to reach 
an uneasy peace, wherein she, as the lost referent, is sacrificed, linguistically, 
physically, and theologically.  
This theological and linguistic sacrifice is addressed very clearly in “Mary,” 
in which Mary, the virgin Mother, acts as a catachresis for “women” within divine 
will. Here the speaker laments the way in which the divinity of Mary has been 
cheapened by efforts to find a culturally-readable image for women: “everybody 
wants you, sweetheart/ everybody got a dream of glory/ Las Vegas got a pin-up 
girl/ they got her armed as they buy and sell her.” But instead of sexualizing or 
cheapening the image of Mary (in order to deny or denigrate the divine in 
“women”), as Las Vegas has done, the speaker wants to reopen her signification. 
Oh Mary, can you hear me? 
Mary, you’re bleeding 
Mary, don’t be afraid 
we’re just waking up 
and I hear help is on the way 
Clearly, the speaker here believes that the Judeo-Christian community is ready 
for a new perspective on Mary, her divinity, and the ordination of women within 
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divine will. The speaker laments, “When I think of what they’ve done to you/ oh 
Mary, can you hear me?” arguing that “Butterflies don’t belong in nets.” Here the 
signification of the butterfly is that of linguistic and theological sacrifice; Mary, and 
the cultural signification of all women, has been sacrificed; and yet, promises the 
speaker, “help is on the way… ‘cause even the wind/ cries your name.” Here the 
speaker seems to refer to Luke 19:40, in which Jesus tells his disciples that even 
if they did not praise him, “the rocks would cry out” (ESV). Amos’ allusion to this 
verse here is a literal call to nature to “cry out” against the denigration of Mary, 
who she argues is a feminine divinity which has been excised and excluded by 
Judeo-Christian patronymy due to her femininity. 
 
Reopening Terms: “Women” and “Queer” 
 Butler argues that the “failure of the signifier to produce the unity it 
appears to name is not the result of an existential void, but the result of that 
term’s incapacity to include the social relations that it provisionally stabilizes 
through a set of contingent exclusions” (221). Further, she assets that to attempt 
to quantify a multiply-constituted category naming is futile; “that there can be no 
final or complete inclusivity is thus a function of the complexity and historicity of a 
social field that can never be summarized by any given description, and that, for 
democratic reasons, ought never to be” (221). Thus, she argues, “non-referential 
terms (such as) ‘women’ and ‘queer’ institute provisional identities and, 
inevitably, a provisional set of exclusions,” which “creates the expectation that a 
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full and final enumeration of features is possible (221). This fallacious 
expectation “orients identity politics toward a full confession of the contents of 
any given identity category” (221), resulting in what Butler calls “foreclosure” 
(221).  
 But, according to Butler, it is this foreclosure which allows the (affirmation) 
of the “anti-descriptivist perspective as the open and democratizing potential of 
the category” (221). Thus, Butler argues, to “ameliorate and rework this violence, 
it is necessary to learn a double movement: to invoke the category and, hence, 
provisionally to institute an identity and at the same time to open the category as 
a site of permanent political contest” (222), in order to “perpetually interrogate the 
exclusions by which it proceeds” and “to learn to live the contingency of the 
political signifier in a culture of democratic contestation” (222).    
 But, Butler asks, how does a term like “queer” come to be an acceptable 
term, given its historicity? “Is this a simple reversal of valuations such that ‘queer’ 
means either a past degradation or a present or future affirmation?....When and 
how does a term like ‘queer’ become subject to an affirmative resignification for 
some when a term like ‘nigger,’ despite some recent efforts at reclamation, 
appears only capable of reinscribing its pain?” (223). Further, she asks, “How is it 
that those who are abjected come to make their claim through and against the 
discourses that have sought their repudiation?” (224).  
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 Butler, in answer to her own queries, argues that “‘queering’ persists as a 
defining moment of performativity” because “(p)erformative acts are forms of 
authoritative speech…that, in the uttering, also perform a certain action and 
exercise a binding power5” (225). Further, Butler notes that “if the power of 
discourse to produce that which it names is linked with the question of 
performativity, then the performative is one domain in which power acts as 
discourse” (225). Thus, there is no power as such, argues Butler, but rather, 
there is the citational act which is “a nexus of power and discourse that repeats 
of mimes the discursive gestures of power” (225). It is not the speaker who 
exercises power in this situation—“it is the power of the citation that gives the 
performative its binding or conferring power… the citational legacy by which a 
contemporary ‘act’ emerges in the context of a chain of binding conventions” 
(225).  
 
The Forming of a (Logical) Subject 
“(R)ecognition is not conferred upon a subject, but forms that subject” 
(Butler 226). I have attempted to reconcile here the idea that a subject can be 
constituted by a society that decides it for itself and bounds it, borders it, as it 
were, into a cage, just like the butterfly in “Mary,” with the idea that women, as 
                                                          
5
 Such an argument is (however hidden) at the heart of the gay marriage debate, for example. Because a 
marriage certificate and the conferral of a marriage license is a performative and authoritative act that 
“exercises(s) a binding power,” people (actually very correctly) see the act as an important signifier in our 
culture, because it represents a discursive pattern change. 
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speaking subjects, can change the conception of what we are as a multiply-
constituted referent. Summatively, I have used Butler’s ideas to show that we are 
constituted in and by the logic of the signifier and by the logic of the signifying 
chain itself. I have, finally, reached the conclusion that a new logic is necessary 
in order to conceive of a new category of “women” in our society.  
Might we revisit a “generative” logic such as that of Bahktin? Is not such a 
logic, in fact, exactly that to which Butler points when she writes about the 
opening of possibilities and linguistic “futures” for terms of identification? Butler 
argues that a term such as “queer,” “through repeated invocation…become(s) 
linked to accusation, pathologization, insult,” and over time, forms “a social bond 
among homophobic communities” (226). But Butler argues next that such a bond 
necessitates a certain “turn against this constitutive historicity” (227). I argue here 
that such a bond works in much the same way in which the constitutive outside 
works: such a community created through language use also creates the 
community shamed by such a usage. The co-opting/reversal/reclamation of the 
term “bitch” is a prime example. In the case of both “queer” and “bitch,” I argue 
that these terms can be seen, referring back to Mendoza-Denton, as “semiotic 
hitchhikers,” which have been “entextualized” and transformed (270). Indeed, her 
description of the effects of “creak” are eerily similar to the roles of the usage of 
the terms “queer” and “bitch:” “distinguishing the (identity of the speaker’s) 
voices;…in orienting the narrator in the moral landscape of the events;…(in) 
cu(ing) differences in participants and points of view” (269). Here, the term 
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“women,” chosen by Butler as one of her cases in point, follows suit in its 
subjectivity to entextualization and re-entextualization, as it were. 
“And yet,” she notes, such an “interrogation of those constitutive and 
exclusionary relations of power through which contemporary discursive 
resources are formed…is crucial to the continuing democratization of queer 
politics” (227) because “it constitutes a self-critical dimension within activism” 
(227). In other words, Butler argues that we must allow an ongoing interrogation 
of these terms to keep them “fresh.”  
A key point of my thesis is that an end to the oppression of women using 
religious texts translated from Hebrew or Greek, using Aristotelian logic as their 
basis, compels a reevaluation of our morality and belief systems using a more 
inclusive logic, such as the logic so ingeniously detailed by Butler and so 
cunningly employed in the lyrics of Amos. Mendoza-Denton mentions, in her 
discussion of “creak,” intonational shadow in the narrative of Don Gabriel in an 
article by Jane Hill, which “breaks the narrative down in to a Bakhtinian interplay 
of voices” (269). Such a narrative provides Mandoza-Denton with a key piece in 
her analysis of “creak,” and here also provides a key example of the kind of logic 
necessitated by my discussion of Kristeva’s notion of jouissance and its 
connection with Butler’s notion of an expansive democratization of the political 
signifier “women” and “queer.”  
It is this very democratization of the signifier “feminine” which I attempt to 
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accomplish in my thesis. Maybe it is time to reopen the signifier “feminine.” By 
keeping in mind Butler’s cautionary tale against foreclosure and her advocacy of 
the democratization of the signifier for the multiply-constituted referent, while 
giving proper attention to the moments of jouissance, of catachresis, of improper 
sense and semiotic hitchhiking in signification, it is possible to reach a non-
essentialist and non-descriptivist conception of the term “feminine.”  The term 
“feminine” is a term with a rich historicity, and while it is not necessary or possible 
to deny this historicity, it may, as Butler argues, be possible to “learn to live the 
contingency” of the category of “women,” “queer,” or “feminine.”  
The women of Amos’ lyrics contain all of those versions of “feminine” 
which have been foreclosed, conflated and used as “sutures” which, according to 
Zižek, disidentify and “cover over” the catechresis associated with collective 
terms (qtd. in Butler 195) like “women.” From their various subject positions—
bitch, prostitute, virgin, lesbian, mother, daughter, girl, woman, wife, divorcée, 
porn star—they utter collectively that which has been catechristically 
disidentified. Moreover, Amos lyrics expose those hidden functions of language, 
bringing to light the misogyny of Western language and language practices 
because of their theologization, reinforced through Judeo-Christian religious 
doctrine. And finally, Amos’ lyrics revision for us a self-aware, powerful, spiritual 
category of women who are infused with a divinity denied them in the past. In 
“Cloud on My Tongue,” the speaker wishes this kind of fulfillment for all women:  
You're already in there 
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I'll be wearing your tattoo 
You're already in there 
Thought I was over the bridge now 
I'm already in 
Circles and circles and circles again 
The girl's in 
Circles and circles 
Got to stop spinning 
Circles and circles and circles again 
Thought I was over the bridge now 
Here, as she speaks first from the perspective of the woman who successfully 
gotten “over the bridge,” and next from the perspective of the girl who is still 
“spinning,” the speaker of the song identifies the kind of reassurance all women 
can have once they have moved past the shame of the wound and the self-
hatred inflicted upon femaleness, “femininity,” and womanhood by the Judeo-
Christian concept of original sin and the functionality of the female body, 
reopening the term “women”—and even the term “feminine”—to new possibilities.  
 
Afterword 
 Is it possible that the terms “feminine” and “women” can be newly 
conceived? Butler asserts that it is to be done only by using these terms, to allow 
them to be on the tongues and on the minds of people, to be redefined locally 
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and “redistributed,” much in the way that Mendoza-Denton or Barthes might 
suggest. Through entextualization of the salient variable, “feminine,” we might 
begin to see small changes over time, which might stem to larger changes over a 
longer period. But first, as a culture—beginning with feminists, I would argue—we 
must reclaim the word “feminine” from its historicity. Many women, even as 
feminists, are guilty of misuse and of pejorative use of the word “feminine” and of 
the term “woman.” To reclaim these terms, we must again become comfortable 
with difference all over again: women are not men. We are women, we are 
“femme”-inine. We are women. To begin, we must confront Judeo-Christian and 
Aristotelian prejudice against women wherever we find it, and we must speak out 
in resistance. We must point out these prejudices to other women and to men, 
wherever we find them. And we must broadcast, as Butler suggests in her 
discussion of “anti-descriptivist perspective” (221), that difference can be a 
starting point for open discussion. 
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